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| Alesina, Alberto; Algan, Yann; Cahuc, Pierre; Giuliano, Paola. |
| Flexible labor markets requires geographically mobile workers to be efficient. Otherwise, firms can take advantage of the immobility of workers and extract monopsony rents. In cultures with strong family ties, moving away from home is costly. Thus, individuals with strong family ties rationally choose regulated labor markets to avoid moving and limiting the monopsony power of firms, even though regulation generates lower employment and income. Empirically, we do find that individuals who inherit stronger family ties are less mobile, have lower wages, are less often employed and support more stringent labor market regulations. There are also positive cross-country correlations between the strength of family ties and labor market rigidities. Finally, we find... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Family Values; Regulation of Labor; Labor Markets; Labor and Human Capital; J; J2; J4. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90908 |
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| Butler, Jeffrey; Giuliano, Paola; Guiso, Luigi. |
| We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We find that individual income is hump-shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs. Heterogeneity of trust beliefs in the population, coupled with the tendency of individuals to extrapolate beliefs about others from their own levels of trustworthiness, could generate this non-monotonic relationship: highly trustworthy individuals tend to form overly optimistic beliefs, to assume too much social risk and to be cheated more often, ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close to the mean trustworthiness of the population. On the other hand, less trustworthy individuals form overly pessimistic beliefs and avoid being cheated, but give up... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Trust; Trustworthiness; Economic Performance; Culture; False Consensus; Labor and Human Capital; A1; A12; D1; O15; Z1. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90947 |
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