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| Goeschl, Timo; Lin, Tun. |
| Landowners are commonly not only better informed about their private cost of conservation than conservation agencies, but also frequently in a position to spend resources on improving their knowledge about contract-relevant parameters before signing a contract on offer. We extend and generalize the literature on conservation contracting by endogenizing the information structure in a setting where the conservation agency is both asymmetrically informed about the efficiency of the landowner and unable to observe whether the landowner collects information after being offered the contract and before signing it. In this setting, we study the optimal contract the conservation agency should offer to the landowner conditional on the cost of information collection.... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12666 |
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| Goeschl, Timo. |
| Non-binding referenda ('petitions') are an instrument of direct democracy that allows citizens to signal preferences to politicians outside the electoral cycle. This paper analyses a particular form of petitions, so-called linked-issues petitions, which have been described as an 'abuse of direct democracy'. It discusses the use of linked petitions by petition initiators, its take-up by voters in terms of volume and voter motives, and applies the analytical insights to a controversial referendum held in Austria in 2002 that linked issues of transboundary nuclear risk and Eastern enlargement of the European Union. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Political Economy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12625 |
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