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| Registros recuperados: 15 | |
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| Graham-Tomasi, Theodore. |
| The problem of optimal depletion of old-growth forests and establishment of plantations is explored. The old-growth has value for the timber products it contains and the wilderness services it provides if left unharvested. The optimal amount of wilderness preserved in the steady-state is characterized and found to increase with increased interest rates and decreased cost of production. The wilderness preserve is largest when silvicultural effort is utilized optimally in plantations. The problem of small initial stock sizes is investigated. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1984 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/13405 |
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| Graham-Tomasi, Theodore. |
| The solution to the problem of how long a present valve maximizing forester should let trees grow has a long history in the literature of economics and forestry. Until recently, however, the comparative statics of the forestry problem when there are two decision variables, an initial input at the time of regeneration of the stand and the rotation period, had not been investigated. In this paper we offer a generalization, clarification, and extension of some recent works in this area. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1983 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14215 |
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| Coggins, Jay S.; Graham-Tomasi, Theodore; Roe, Terry L.. |
| Governments often establish economic policy in response to political pressure by interest groups. Since these groups' political activities may alter prices, economies so affected cannot be characterized by perfect competition. We develop a model of a "lobbying economy" in which consumers' choice of political activity simultaneously determines relative prices and income levels. They balance the loss in income due to lobbying payments against the potential gain in wealth from a favorable government price policy. This paper proves the existence of an equilibrium in economies of this sort. We reformulate the economy as a generalized lobbying game and prove the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium in the game. This equilibrium is then shown to be an... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Rent seeking; Generalized game; Lobbying equilibrium; Political Economy. |
| Ano: 1988 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7468 |
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| Registros recuperados: 15 | |
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