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| Guerriero, Carmine. |
| This paper analyzes the effects of supervisors (i.e., regulators and judges) selection rules on regulated prices. A checks and balances regulatory review process strengthens the role of the judicial power and election increases the populism of implicitly motivated supervisors. Election arises when the risk related to expropriation of sunk investments and the inter-party distance are lower. Employing U.S. electric power markets data, the empirical evidence strongly confirms these predictions. Indeed, when treated as endogenous, only the election of administrative law judges and not the one of regulators significantly lowers the level of electricity rates. Moreover a more effective supervision technology shows a marginal negative effect on regulated rates... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12204 |
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| Guerriero, Carmine. |
| This paper analyzes the constitutional determinants of cost reimbursement rules. In order to design the optimal incentive schemes, a possibly partisan planner will take into account the market cost structure, the institutional design of the supervision hierarchical structure and its technology. I employ electricity data from the U.S. electric power market to test the models predictions. The evidence shows that reforms from low powered incentive scheme (COS) to high powered one (PBR) are linked to high cost industries, the presence of elected supervisors, high inter-party platform distance and large (slim) majority when the reformer is Republican (Democratic). Moreover, there is some evidence in the data that performance-based regulation lowers regulated... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Demand and Price Analysis. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12197 |
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