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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Lazarev, Valery (2) Gregory, Paul R. (1) Palavra-chave Political Economy (2) Bureaucracy (1) Composition of GDP (1) D72 (1) E20 (1) Hierarchy (1) Implicit contract (1) J45 (1) Labor Productivity (1) N44 (1) Non-democratic regimes (1) P20 (1) P30 (1) Political support (1) Post-Communist Transition (1) Price Distortions. (1) Promotion incentives (1) Soviet Union (1) Value Added (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2004 (2) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Structural Change in Russian Transition AgEcon Gregory, Paul R.; Lazarev, Valery. This paper examines structural change in the Russian economy in 1990-2001, as measured by the changing composition of output and consumption, using international panel data sets as a frame of reference. It calculates a series of indexes to determine the extent to which the Russian economy is converging towards market economies. Although the Russian structure of output is becoming increasingly similar to that of upper-middle and the lower tier of high-income countries, the structure of Russian manufacturing is inconsistent with its income level and the extent of labor reallocation remains inadequate. Russia’s pattern of consumption remains distorted due to the incomplete price liberalization. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Post-Communist Transition; Value Added; Labor Productivity; Composition of GDP; Price Distortions.; Political Economy; E20; P20. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28531 Political Rents, Promotion Incentives, and Support for a Non-Democratic Regime AgEcon Lazarev, Valery. This paper analyzes the economic foundations of a non-democratic political regime, where the ruling bureaucracy captures rents through collective control over state property and job assignment. The model developed here yields the equilibrium in the “political labor market,” where the ruling bureaucracy buys services and political support of activists recruited from the working population. The underlying implicit contract requires that the incumbent bureaucrats retire after a certain time to allow for deferred promotion of activists into rent-paying positions. The major implications are that the stability of a non-democratic regime is consistent with high-income gap between the rulers and the rest of the population, strengthened when government pursues an... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Non-democratic regimes; Bureaucracy; Hierarchy; Political support; Promotion incentives; Implicit contract; Soviet Union; Political Economy; D72; J45; N44; P30. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28381 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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