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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Karp, Larry S. (3) Lee, In Ho (3) Mason, Robin (1) Palavra-chave C72 (1) C79 (1) Congestion (1) Coordination problem (1) D83 (1) D84 (1) D92 (1) Economic growth (1) Global games (1) International Development (1) International Relations/Trade (1) Leapfrogging (1) Learning-by-doing (1) O14 (1) O33 (1) Open-loop policies (1) Overtaking (1) Public Economics (1) Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies (1) Stationarity (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (3) Ano 2003 (1) 2000 (2) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements AgEcon Karp, Larry S.; Lee, In Ho; Mason, Robin. We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent’s payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents’ strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action, because of the risk of overcrowding. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Global games; Congestion; Coordination problem; International Relations/Trade; C79; D84. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25014 Time-Consistent Policies AgEcon Karp, Larry S.; Lee, In Ho. In many cases the optimal open-loop policy to influence agents who solve dynamic problems is time-inconsistent. We show how to construct a time-consistent open-loop policy rule. We also consider an additional restriction under which the time-consistent open-loop policy is stationary. We use examples to illustrate the properties of these tax rules. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Time inconsistency; Open-loop policies; Stationarity; Public Economics; C72; D83. Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6275 Learning-by-Doing and the Choice of Technology: The Role of Patience AgEcon Karp, Larry S.; Lee, In Ho. If agents learn-by-doing and are myopic, less advanced firms might adopt new technologies while more advanced firms stick with the old technology. This kind of overtaking can also occur if agents are forward looking and have high discount rates. However, overtaking never occurs if agents are sufficiently patient. A finite discount rate increases the set of states at which agents adopt new technologies, so more patient agents tend to upgrade their technology more frequently. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Learning-by-doing; Overtaking; Leapfrogging; Technology adoption; Economic growth; International Development; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; D92; O14; O33. Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25108 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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