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| Lima, Ricardo Chaves; Irmao, Jose Ferreira. |
| The theory of contracts assumes that human nature is essentially opportunistic, and economic agents protect themselves against adverse selection and moral hazard by elaborating contracts. In the case of irrigated areas in the Brazilian northeast, such contracts are not necessarily formal. That is, arrangements based on economic agent’s word are common. The data used are from acerola producers in the Petrolina-Juazeiro irrigation project. The empirical model was tobit, given that the dependent variable was characterized by a truncated distribution. The results showed that the decision to engage on contractual relations is fundamentally defined by the degree of dependence of the farmer in respect to the processing industry. Furthermore, past experience of... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Vertical coordination; Contracts; Irrigation; Tobit model; Industrial Organization. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56813 |
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| Carvalho, Regina Celia de; Lima, Ricardo Chaves. |
| International market for some agricultural commodities can be characterized by oligopoly, in which participants behave in a non cooperative manner, provoking marketing disputes. According to this scenario, strategic trade policies have been utilized to as an instrument of market share contents by international market members. Hence, when a country adopts some strategic trade policy, impacts of such policy are felt by other market participants. A subsidy granted by an exporting country, for instance, may result on a raise in exports; whereas taxing production of exports may work as a deterrent to shipments to the international market. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Strategic trade policy; International market; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55189 |
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