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| Registros recuperados: 27 | |
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| Marette, Stephan. |
| An investigation of financing an inspection policy while allowing the enforcement of a market regulation is described. A simple model shows that the intensity of controls depends on the market structure. Under a given number of firms, the per-firm probability of controls is lower than one, since firms' incentive to comply with regulation holds under positive profits. In this case, a lump-sum tax is used for limiting distortions coming from financing with a fixed fee. Under free entry, the per-firm probability of controls is equal to one, and only a fixed fee that prevents excess entry is used to finance inspection. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Inspection policies; Market regulation; Regulatory funding; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18351 |
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| Crespi, John M.; Marette, Stephan. |
| An analytical framework where consumers display preferences for various qualities of an agricultural commodity is used to investigate the producer welfare effects of generic advertising assessments. Depending upon the degree of product differentiation present in the final goods, some producers are shown to benefit more than others from the use of an equivalent assessment on all producers. This paper delineates those cases where producer assessments should be equal and where assessments should be different to insure an equitable benefit. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Marketing. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20762 |
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| Roosen, Jutta; Bieberstein, Andrea; Marette, Stephan; Blanchemanche, Sandrine; Vandermoere, Frederic. |
| We evaluate the impact of different information sequences on participants’ hypothetical willingness to pay (WTP) for food produced using nanotechnology. In three treatment groups, information on the health, societal, or environmental impact linked to nanotechnology was revealed in different sequences: an imposed order, a chosen order, and a chosen order after a discussion among participants. Results show that information choice is important. While in the imposed order, the first information revealed has no effect on WTP, the information chosen first has a strong impact. Discussion has no further impact. Health information was a priority and significantly decreased WTP, while societal and environmental information did not significantly influence WTP. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Discussion; Experimental economics; Food nanotechnology; Information choice; Willingness to pay; Demand and Price Analysis. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/117398 |
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| Boizot-Szantai, Christine; Lecocq, Sebastien; Marette, Stephan. |
| In this article, the impact of common labels is investigated with both theoretical and empirical approaches. Recent statistics regarding the egg market in France suggest that retailer brands largely adopt common labels. A simple theoretical framework enables us to determine the conditions under which producers and/or retailers with different product qualities decide to post a common label on their products. In particular, a situation of multiple equilibria (one where the label is used by the high-quality seller only and one where it is used by the low-quality seller only) is exhibited when the cost of the label is relatively large. The demand is then estimated for different segments of the French egg market, including producer/retailer brands with/without... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Competition; Demand estimation; Labels; Product differentiation; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18588 |
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| Marette, Stephan. |
| This paper revisits the issue of the regulatory choice between a mandatory label and a minimum-quality standard. When the cost of regulation is relatively low, we show that the socially optimal choice depends on the producers' cost structure for complying with regulation and improving quality. Under a marginal cost for improving quality, the mandatory labeling is sufficient for reaching the socially optimal level of quality. Under a fixed cost for improving quality, we show that each instrument or the combination of both instruments may emerge at the equilibrium. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cost of regulation; Information; Standard; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18458 |
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| Coestier, B.; Gozlan, Estelle; Marette, Stephan. |
| Under a market setting, we analyse the impact of legal liability on prevention, taking into account the possible limited wealth of firms. We show that under strict liability, firms my choose ex ante not to be able to fully indemnify victims ex post: whatever the market structure, they may use limited liability strategically by investing in prevention in excess of what is socially optimal. The negligence rule prevents firms from over-investment. For high levels of damages, under both liability rules, firms exert an insufficient effort of prevention. A welfare analysis established that when the judgment proof problem is acute, the optimal public intervention ranges from banning the production to imposing the negligence rule. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Marketing. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8531 |
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| Bureau, Jean-Christophe; Gozlan, Estelle; Marette, Stephan. |
| Focusing on the issue of food safety, we consider a framework of repeated purchases under the scenario of imperfect information on product quality (adverse selection and experience goods). A firm in a northern country can more easily detect tainted products than can a southern one. When imports are banned, the northern firm does not always signal the actual quality of its products. Competition from imports may lead the northern firm to test the quality of its products as a way to differentiate itself from foreign competitors. Consumers benefit from the disclosure of information on quality, even though borders are open to products of uncertain quality. However, competition from imports also increases the cost of signaling high quality. This can be... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Adverse selection; North-south trade; Signaling; Trade; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18636 |
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| Yue, Chengyan; Marette, Stephan; Beghin, John C.. |
| In the context of the wine industry, we investigate producers' choice between geographic indications and brand advertising to convey information to consumers. Producers also decide whether or not to select an effort level for improving the quality of their products. We show that if this effort is selected, a producer will prefer to rely on brand advertising for promoting its products and set up its own reputation. Despite the sharing of the promotion cost, a geographic indication does not sufficiently reward the effort for improving quality. Finally, the selection of both instruments by producers is examined. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Marketing. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21310 |
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| Marette, Stephan; Zago, Angelo M.. |
| In this paper we consider the role for collective action in advertising investments needed to compete on foreign markets and/or to enter into new markets. We model the choices facing producers in regions where both AO (high quality) and table (low quality) wines are produced. By joining forces with producers of other regions to invest in advertising, producers may penetrate into new markets. We show that it is profitable to enter into the new markets when, other things being equal, the size of the new market is relatively big, when the traditional market is relatively small, and when the size of the fixed investment in advertising is relatively small. We discuss the policy implications of the results, examining possible modifications of the AO system... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Marketing. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/27049 |
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| Marette, Stephan. |
| This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety overinvestment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Information; Market structure; Safety; Standard; Consumer/Household Economics. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18429 |
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| Registros recuperados: 27 | |
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