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| McEvoy, David M.; Stranlund, John K.. |
| Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Voluntary agreements; Self-enforcing agreements; Emissions tax; Enforcement; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7382 |
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| McEvoy, David M.; Stranlund, John K.. |
| Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have typically employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing these agreements once they are in place. Most analyses of IEAs simply ignore the issue of enforcing compliance. In this paper we analyze a static IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent enforcement body with the power to monitor the parties' compliance to the terms of an IEA and impose penalties in cases of noncompliance. This approach is broadly consistent with the enforcement mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21403 |
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| McEvoy, David M.; Souza Monteiro, Diogo M.. |
| In the recent past the United States has had a number of severe food-safety outbreaks in the produce, vegetable and beef industry that greatly disrupted the food system. In all these outbreaks here were severe disruptions on sales that affected the whole industry, and it took an extended period of time to correctly locate the source of the outbreak. Traceability can be an effective tool to reduce the impact of food safety incidents my expediting the search for the origin of outbreaks. This paper investigates to what extent an industry-led voluntary agreement for providing traceability can reduce the cost of a food-safety outbreak. We find that a voluntary agreement on traceability can successfully reduce the cost of a food-safety outbreak but will unlikely... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Traceability; Voluntary agreements; Food safety; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43860 |
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| McEvoy, David M.; Brandt, Sylvia J.; Lavoie, Nathalie; Anders, Sven M.. |
| In this paper we use a general model of imperfect competition to predict welfare changes within an open-access fishery transitioning to individual transferable quota (ITQ) management. Although related research has explored the effects of market power in the harvesting sector on ITQ performance, none have considered the implications of an imperfectly competitive processing sector. This study addresses this question specifically in the context of the Atlantic herring fishery, although its implications are relevant to all fisheries with similar industry structure. Our results show that ITQs could have a negative impact on fishermen’s welfare when processors have market power and the cap on aggregate harvest is binding or becomes binding with the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: ITQ; Imperfect competition; Welfare analysis; Fisheries; Risk and Uncertainty; D43; Q22; Q28; L13. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7389 |
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| McEvoy, David M.; Stranlund, John K.. |
| Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have typically employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing these agreements once they are in place. Most analyses of IEAs simply ignore the issue of enforcing compliance by parties to the terms of an agreement. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent enforcement body with the power to monitor the parties' compliance to the terms of the IEA and impose penalties in cases of noncompliance. This approach is broadly consistent with the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14537 |
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