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| Kobayashi, Mimako; Melkonyan, Tigran A.. |
| We model a game between two players taking biosecurity actions and characterize the Nash equilibria and their properties for the cases of strategic complements and substitutes. Implications of the theoretical model are investigated using data for biosecurity behavior among producers participating in a livestock exhibition. Biosecurity actions with own benefits and lasting impacts in home communities exhibit a positive relationship with behavior of the producers from geographically close areas. The number and probabilities of biosecurity actions taken by exhibitors are positively associated with the number of animals exhibited and they vary among commercial and hobby producers and across species/types of commercial production. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: California; Livestock disease; Livestock exhibition; Strategic complements; Strategic substitutes; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/117152 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Ligon, Ethan; Melkonyan, Tigran A.. |
| We examine interactions among explicit and implicit contracting practices for a sample of 385 intermediaries in California fruit and vegetable markets. Explicit practices are measured with an indicator for the existence of a formal contract, and with indicators for various contract specifications (e.g., target delivery date, volume, acreage). Implicit practices are measured directly with a question about the existence of an “implicit understanding,” and indirectly with questions about the extent of informal involvement in farm-level decision making. Firms that manufacture processed foods, and that grow in house a portion of their total farm input, are significantly more likely to report use of explicit and implicit contracting practices. Additionally,... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness; Farm Management. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6068 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Melkonyan, Tigran A.. |
| This papers analyzes efficient regulatory design of a polluting firm who has two kinds of private information about its production environment. First, the firm has better information than the regulator regarding technological possibilities for controlling pollution; and second, some aspects of the firm's implementation of a given technology are potentially unobservable. Design standards that specify a particular pollution abatement technology for the firm are efficient when the level of information asymmetry regarding technology choice is low, and when the cost of performance measurement is high; performance standards are efficient when the level of penalty needed to induce efficient implementation is unlikely to bankrupt the firm; and process standards... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22148 |
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