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| Wu, Steven Y.; Nazaryan, Natalie; Roe, Brian E.; Sporleder, Thomas L.. |
| Experimental economics is used to compare tournaments (T) and fixed performance contracts (F) when agents have heterogeneous costs. Our primary findings were: (1) There is no statistical difference in average pooled effort (effort by high ability and low ability subjects are pooled together to get an aggregate average) under T and F contracts, (2) on average, effort exerted by high ability agents is considerably higher than effort exerted by low ability agents under both types of contracts, (3) average pooled payoff for the subjects is affected by the type of contract used. Statistical analysis of the results revealed that high ability subjects generally benefit from tournaments whereas low ability agents are harmed by tournaments. Only in the case... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20103 |
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| Wu, Steven Y.; Roe, Brian E.; Sporleder, Thomas L.; Nazaryan, Natalie. |
| Experimental economics is used to compare tournaments (T) and fixed performance contracts (F) when agents have heterogeneous costs. Results suggest that: (1) There is no difference in average pooled effort across contracts, (2) high ability agents exert higher effort than low ability agents under both types of contracts, (3) average pooled earnings are affected by contract type, (4) high ability agents benefit from T whereas low ability agents are harmed by T, and (5) the difference in average pay between high and low ability agents is larger under T. Thus, T implement greater inequality. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28318 |
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