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Ndayisenga, Fidele; Kinsey, Jean D.. |
This study tests the hypothesis that lobbying by food firms does not contravene United States farm policy, particularly commodity programs. The research is important in the analysis and understanding of the difficulties of designing and reforming agricultural policies. If farm programs significantly benefit downstream food firms, there is effectively no countervailing power to the farm lobby because (1) farm input supply and marketing firms have been shown to benefit from existing farm policies - and have therefore no incentive to lobby against the policies - and (2) consumers and taxpayers, two important stakeholders in agricultural policies, are known to be quite inefficient in lobbying due to their "large-group" characteristics. Information on food... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy. |
Ano: 1994 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/13581 |
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Ndayisenga, Fidele; Kinsey, Jean D.. |
The objective of this paper is to systematically incorporate lobbying in a microeconomic model of the profit maximizing farmer, derive testable implications of the model and apply it to establish the link, or lack thereof, between policy benefits transferred to farmers and their lobbying expenditures. Policy transfers will be measured by the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE), a comprehensive annual dollar measure of transfers to producers that results from government intervention in agriculture (Josling and Tangerman, 1988). |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Political Economy. |
Ano: 1995 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14435 |
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