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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Olsen, Rene H. (3) Bogetoft, Peter (2) Jensen, Peter Max Friis (2) Olesen, Henrik Ballebye (2) Nielsen, Kurt (1) Palavra-chave Agribusiness (3) Asymmetric information (1) Double auctions (1) Economics of cooperatives (1) Efficient trade. (1) Incentives (1) Multi-unit (1) Quota exchange (1) Single bid (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (3) Ano 2002 (1) 2001 (1) 1999 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Single Bid Restriction in Milk Quota Exchanges - Comparing the Danish and the Ontario Exchanges AgEcon Bogetoft, Peter; Jensen, Peter Max Friis; Nielsen, Kurt; Olesen, Henrik Ballebye; Olsen, Rene H.. This paper analyzes the design of the Danish milk quota exchange. We focus on the restriction that each producer can only submit a single bid (a quantity and a price limit). We argue that this restriction creates inefficiencies for two reasons. First, a single bid cannot express a buyer's downward sloping demand curve (the aggregation effect). Second, the buyers minimize the risk of foregoing profitable trade by submitting their average valuation rather than their marginal valuation of quota (the uncertainty effect). We use data from the (multiple bids) Ontario milk quota exchange, to evaluate the empirical impact of a single bid restriction. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Quota exchange; Single bid; Multi-unit; Double auctions; Efficient trade.; Agribusiness. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24181 The Advantage of Cooperatives under Asymmetric Cost Information AgEcon Bogetoft, Peter; Jensen, Peter Max Friis; Olsen, Rene H.. We consider how to organize the processing and marketing of an agricultural product when farming costs are known only by the individual farmers. We show that when marginal costs are un-correlated and the market for final goods is competitive, the socially optimal production levels may be sustained by a cooperative and a cooperative only. We show also that the cooperative form is particularly useful when the uncertainty is large and the net revenue product is small. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Economics of cooperatives; Asymmetric information; Incentives; Agribusiness. Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24176 Discrimination and Strategic Group Division in Tournaments AgEcon Olesen, Henrik Ballebye; Olsen, Rene H.. The contracts we consider in this paper must solve three problems: moral hazard, insurance and discrimination. The moral hazard problem is that of providing the agents with incentives to perform in a way that maximizes the profit to the principal, when the agent's actions are unobservable. The insurance problem is that of minimizing the cost of risk through risk minimization and risk sharing. The issue of discrimination is that of paying agents with different skills sufficiently to participate, without overcompensating other agents. We show how the principal may benefit from a strategic division of the agents into different tournaments or groups. The optimal number of groups from the principal's point of view is determined through a trade-off between moral... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24183 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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