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| Quattri, Maria A.; Ozanne, Adam; Wang, Xioabing; Hall, Alastair R.. |
| The recognition that policies aimed at “getting prices right” in less developed countries were failing due to incomplete markets has spurred a new wave of reforms, directed instead at “getting markets and institutions right”. Although previous studies have documented the potentially crucial role of the brokerage institution in crop commercialisation, few have investigated what determines wholesalers’ decisions to use brokers. Using data collected in 2006/07 by Gabre-Madhin, IFPRI and EDRI, we examine Ethiopian traders’ decisions regarding whether or not they should use brokers, and how much. Independent variables are human, financial and social asset availability, implemented trading practices, access to infrastructure and institutions, location, travelled... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness; O12; O13; O18. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108941 |
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| Ozanne, Adam; White, Benedict. |
| Moxey, White and Ozanne (1999) have shown how transfer payments coupled with input quotas can be used to design optimal truth-telling mechanisms for voluntary agri-environmental schemes under hidden information about compliance costs. Ozanne, Hogan and Colman (2001) adapted the Moxey et al. model to analyze hidden action in such schemes, analyzing the relationships between input abatement, the cost of monitoring compliance and farmers’ risk preferences. White (2002) extended the Moxey et al. model to analyze the design of contracts under both hidden action and hidden information, but used an input charge/transfer payment approach rather than the original input quota/transfer payment one. In addition, he assumed that farmers caught cheating face a variable... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/58196 |
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