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| Registros recuperados: 36 | |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Sigman, Hilary; Walls, Margaret; Williams, Roberton C., III. |
| This paper reviews theoretical and empirical literature on the household distribution of the costs and benefits of pollution control policies, and ways of integrating distributional issues into environmental cost-benefit analysis. Most studies find that policy costs fall disproportionately on poorer groups, though this is less pronounced when lifetime income is used, and policies affect prices of inputs used pervasively across the economy. The policy instrument itself is also critical; freely allocated emission permits may hurt the poor the most, as they transfer income to shareholders via scarcity rents created by higher prices, while emissions taxes offer opportunities for progressive revenue recycling. And although low-income households appear to bear a... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Distributional incidence; Emissions taxes; Tradable permits; Environmental benefits; Distributional weights; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q52; Q58; H22. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10651 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Small, Kenneth A.. |
| This paper develops an analytical framework for assessing the second-best optimal level of gasoline taxation taking into account unpriced pollution, congestion, and accident externalities, and interactions with the broader fiscal system. We provide calculations of the optimal taxes for the US and the UK under a wide variety of parameter scenarios, with the gasoline tax substituting for a distorting tax on labor income. Under our central parameter values, the second-best optimal gasoline tax is $1.01/gal for the US and $1.34/gal for the UK. These values are moderately sensitive to alternative parameter assumptions. The congestion externality is the largest component in both nations, and the higher optimal tax for the UK is due mainly to a higher assumed... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Gasoline tax; Pollution; Congestion; Accidents; Fiscal interactions; Public Economics; H21; H23; R48. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10461 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| This paper provides simple formulas for adjusting the costs of carbon taxes and tradable carbon permits to account for interactions with preexisting tax distortions in the labor market. Both policies reduce labor supply as they increase product prices and reduce real household wages; the resulting efficiency losses in the labor market can be substantial relative to partial equilibrium abatement costs. However, much of this added cost can be offset-and perhaps more than offset when additional distortions from the tax system are considered-if revenues from carbon taxes or auctioned permits are used to reduce distortionary taxes. Consequently, there can be a strong case on efficiency grounds for using carbon taxes or auctioned permits over grandfathered... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Carbon taxes; Carbon permits; Fiscal interactions; Revenue recycling; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10509 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| It is widely perceived that projected public spending on transportation infrastructure in the metropolitan Washington, DC, area for the next 20 years will not be enough to halt, let alone reverse, the trend of increasing traffic congestion. Consequently, there has been much debate about how additional sources of local revenues might be raised to finance more transportation spending. This paper develops and implements an analytical framework for estimating the efficiency costs of raising $500 million per annum in local revenue from five possible sources. These sources are increasing labor taxes, property taxes, gasoline taxes, transit fares, and implementing congestion taxes. Our model incorporates congestion and pollution externalities, and it allows for... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Transportation; Taxes; Washington DC; Welfare cost; Public Economics; R48; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10552 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| Health policy will be a major issue in Britain's next general election. The Labour government is committed to a substantial increase in funds for the National Health Service (NHS) and has eliminated tax relief for private health insurance. The Conservative Opposition party favors subsidizing private health insurance, though it has pledged to match the government's funding increases for the NHS. This paper develops and implements a methodology for estimating the welfare effects of increasing public and private health care in the United Kingdom, when these policies are financed either by distortionary taxes or by user fees for the NHS. User fees are currently minimal, and the national health market "clears" by creating waiting costs. In the private sector we... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: National Health Service; Private health care; Rationing; Subsidies; Welfare effects; Health Economics and Policy; I18; I11; H42. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10822 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| Previous literature has shown that competition among regional governments may lead to inefficiently low levels of capital taxation, because governments do not take account of the external benefits of capital flight to other regions. However, the fiscal distortion is smaller the more elastic the supply of capital (for the region bloc), if governments are not perfectly competitive, or they behave in part as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan. There has been very little empirical work on the magnitude of the welfare effects of fiscal competition. This paper presents extensive calculations of the welfare effects using a model that incorporates the possibility of Leviathan behavior, strategic behavior by governments, monopsony power in factor markets, and a wide... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Fiscal competition; Tax harmonization; Welfare costs; Leviathan; Strategic behavior; Public Economics; H73; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10848 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Pizer, William A.; Fischer, Carolyn. |
| Economists have speculated that the welfare gains from technological innovation that reduces the future costs of environmental protection could be a lot more important than the "Pigouvian" welfare gains over time from correcting a pollution externality. If so, then a primary concern in the design of environmental policies should be the impact on induced innovation, and a potentially strong case could be made for additional instruments such as research subsidies. This paper examines the magnitude of the welfare gains from innovation relative to the discounted Pigouvian welfare gains, using a dynamic social planning model in which research and development (R&D) augments a knowledge stock that reduces future pollution abatement costs. We find that the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10883 |
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| Portney, Paul R.; Parry, Ian W.H.; Gruenspecht, Howard K.; Harrington, Winston. |
| This paper discusses several rationales for the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program, including reduced oil dependence, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, and the possibility that fuel saving benefits from higher standards might exceed added vehicle costs. We then summarize what can be said about the welfare effects of tightening standards, accounting for prior fuel taxes, and perverse effects on congestion and traffic accidents through the impact of improved fuel economy on the incentive to drive. Implications of CAFE on local air pollution, and the controversy over CAFE, vehicle weight, and road safety, are also discussed. Finally, we describe ways in which the existing CAFE program could be substantially improved and identify a variety of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Fuel economy; Externalities; Oil dependency; Vehicle safety; Climate change; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; R48; Q48; H23. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10863 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| Gasoline taxes are widely perceived as the most efficient instrument for reducing gasoline consumption because they exploit all behavioral responses for reducing fuel use, including reduced driving and improved fuel economy. At present, however, higher fuel taxes are viewed as a political nonstarter. Pay-as-you-drive (PAYD) auto insurance, which involves replacing existing lump-sum premiums with premiums that vary in proportion to miles driven, should be more practical, since they do not raise driving costs for the average motorist. We show that when impacts on a broad range of motor vehicle externalities are considered, PAYD also induces significantly higher welfare gains than comparable gasoline tax increases, for fuel reductions below 9%. The reason is... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Gasoline tax; Pay-as-you-drive insurance; Mileage tax; Welfare effects; Motor vehicle externality; Risk and Uncertainty; H21; H23; R48. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10465 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Bento, Antonio M.. |
| This paper uses analytical and numerical models to illustrate how the presence of other distortions within the transport system changes the overall welfare effect of a congestion tax. These other distortions include a transit fare subsidy, congestion on competing (unpriced) routes, accident externalities, gasoline taxes, and pollution externalities. Each of these pre-existing distortions can substantially alter the welfare effect of a congestion tax that would be predicted by a first-best analysis. If congestion taxes encourage travel on other congested routes, they can produce sizeable indirect welfare losses. In addition, induced reductions in the demand for gasoline can lead to substantial welfare losses when, as appears to be the case for European... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Congestion tax; Welfare effect; Transit subsidy; Gasoline tax; Accidents; Pollution; Public Economics; R41; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10678 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Bento, Antonio M.. |
| This paper explores the interactions between taxes on work-related traffic congestion and pre-existing distortionary taxes in the labor market. A congestion tax raises the overall costs of commuting to work and discourages labor force participation at the margin, when revenues are returned in lump-sum transfers. We find that the resulting efficiency loss in the labor market can be larger than the Pigouvian efficiency gains from internalizing the congestion externality. In contrast, if congestion tax revenues are used to reduce labor taxes the net impact on labor supply is positive, and the efficiency gain in the labor market can raise the overall welfare gains of the congestion tax by as much as 100 percent. Recycling congestion tax revenues in public... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Externalities; Congestion taxes; Pre-existing tax distortions; General equilibrium; Welfare effects; Public Economics; R41; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10548 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Fischer, Carolyn; Harrington, Winston. |
| This paper develops analytical models to estimate the welfare effects of higher Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards on new passenger vehicles. The analysis incorporates a broad range of fuel-and-driving-related externalities, fuel taxes, different assumptions concerning consumers' valuation of fuel saving technologies and their alternative value in enhancing other vehicle attributes, and endogenous vehicle fleet composition. To implement the analysis, we develop estimates of CAFE's impact on local pollution, nationwide congestion, and traffic accidents. We find that higher fuel economy standards can produce anything from moderate welfare gains, to very little or no effect, to substantial welfare losses, depending on how consumers value fuel... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Fuel economy standards; Oil dependency; Carbon emissions; Rebound effect; Gasoline tax; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; R48; Q48; H23. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10605 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Bento, Antonio M.. |
| A number of recent studies have shown that the general equilibrium welfare effects of externality-correcting policies depend importantly on pre-existing taxes in the economy, particularly those that distort the labor market. This paper extends the prior literature by allowing for consumption goods that are deductible from labor taxes. These "goods" represent medical insurance, other less tangible fringe benefits, mortgage interest, and so on. The initial tax system effectively subsidizes tax-favored consumption relative to other consumption, in addition to distorting the labor market. We find that incorporating tax-favored consumption may overturn key results from earlier studies. In particular, a revenue-neutral pollution tax (or auctioned pollution... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental policies; Distortionary taxes; Tax deductions; Welfare effects; Environmental Economics and Policy; H23; Q28; L51. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10737 |
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| Goulder, Lawrence H.; Parry, Ian W.H.; Williams, Roberton C., III; Burtraw, Dallas. |
| This paper employs analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to examine the costs of achieving pollution reductions under a range of environmental policy instruments in a second-best setting with pre-existing factor taxes. We compare the costs and overall efficiency impacts of emissions taxes, emissions quotas, fuels taxes, performance standards, and mandated technologies, and explore how costs change with the magnitude of pre-existing taxes and the extent of pollution abatement. We find that the presence of distortionary taxes raises the costs of pollution abatement under each instrument relative to its costs in a first-best world. This extra cost is an increasing function of the magnitude of pre-existing tax rates. For plausible values of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: General equilibrium efficiency analysis; Environmental instrument choice; Second-best regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; D58; H21; L51. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10522 |
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| Registros recuperados: 36 | |
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