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	Provedor de dados 31 (5) Autor Karp, Larry S. (5) Paul, Thierry (5) Palavra-chave Adjustment costs (3) Markov perfection (3) Dynamic tariffs (2) Labor and Human Capital (2) Time inconsistency (2) C61 (1) Coordination games (1) Costs of adjustment (1) Disadvantageous policy (1) Dynamic policies (1) Environmental externality (1) F13 (1) Factor reallocation (1) Government subsidies (1) Indeterminacy (1) Industrial Organization (1) International Relations/Trade (1) J20 (1) J21 (1) J24 (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (5) Ano 2005 (1) 2002 (1) 1998 (1) 1994 (1) 1993 (1) País United States (5) Idioma Inglês (5)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última PHASING IN AND PHASING OUT PROTECTIONISM WITH COSTLY ADJUSTMENTS OF LABOUR 31 Karp, Larry S.; Paul, Thierry. We study the dynamics of optimal trade policy in a model with costly inter-sectoral adjustment of labour, where migrants pay less than the marginal social cost of migration. If workers have rational expectations, a future tariff has an announcement effect on the current migration decision. If the government is able to commit itself to future policy, the optimal trajectory involves phasing in and then phasing out protection of the dying sector. This contrasts with recommendations of gradual liberalization. Without the ability to make commitments, the equilibrium policy begins with and maintains free trade. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Adjustment costs; Dynamic tariffs; Time inconsistency; Markov perfection; International Relations/Trade. Ano: 1993 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51112 LABOR ADJUSTMENT AND GRADUAL REFORM: IS COMMITMENT IMPORTANT? 31 Karp, Larry S.; Paul, Thierry. We analyze a model in which a government uses a second best policy to affect the reallocation of labor, following a change in relative prices. We consider two extreme cases, in which the government has either unlimited or negligible ability to commit to future actions. We explain why the ability to make commitments may be unimportant, and we illustrate this conjecture with numerical examples. For either assumption about commitment ability, the equilibrium policy involves gradual liberalization. The dying sector is protected during the transition to a free market, in order to decrease the amount of unemployment Our results are sensitive to the assumptions about migration. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Adjustment costs; Dynamic tariffs; Time inconsistency; Markov perfection; Labor and Human Capital. Ano: 1994 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51222 Unemployment and the "Labour-Management Conspiracy" 31 Karp, Larry S.; Paul, Thierry. We study a model in which management and a union bargain sequentially, first choosing a rule that will later determine the level of employment, and then choosing a wage. The government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy. An exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionized sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage. Government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour, because of the induced change in the endogenous wage. Unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a "labour-management conspiracy". Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Unemployment; Government subsidies; Wage bargaining; Labor and Human Capital; J58; J68. Ano: 1998 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25040 Friction and the Multiplicity of Equilibria 31 Karp, Larry S.; Paul, Thierry. In familiar models, a decrease in the friction facing mobile factors (e.g., lowering their adjustment costs) increases a coordination problem, leading to more circumstances where there are multiple equilibria. We show that a decrease in friction can decrease coordination problems if, for example, a production externality arises from a changing stock of knowledge or a changing environmental stock. In general, the relation between the amount of friction that mobile factors face and the likelihood of multiple equilibria is non-monotonic. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Indeterminacy; Multiple equilibria; Coordination games; Factor reallocation; Environmental externality; Learning-by-doing; Costs of adjustment; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C61; J21; O13; R23. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25120 Intersectoral Adjustment and Policy Intervention: the Importance of General Equilibrium Effects 31 Karp, Larry S.; Paul, Thierry. We model adjustment costs in a general equilibrium setting using a "transport sector". This sector provides services needed to re-allocate a factor of production across two other sectors. A market imperfection in the transport sector causes adjustment to occur too slowly in the absence of government intervention. The government has a restricted menu of second best policies to remedy this imperfection. Given this restricted menu, the optimal policy choice depends on the government's ability to make commitments. The key to these results is our replacement of the black box of adjustment costs with an explicit model of these costs. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Adjustment costs; Dynamic policies; Time-inconsistency; Markov perfection; Disadvantageous policy; Industrial Organization; F13; J20; J24. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25114 Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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