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| Pin, Paolo; Franz, Silvio; Marsili, Matteo. |
| Our societies are heterogeneous in many dimensions such as census, education, religion, ethnic and cultural composition. The links between individuals - e.g. by friendship, marriage or collaboration - are not evenly distributed, but rather tend to be concentrated within the same group. This phenomenon, called imbreeding homophily, has been related to either (social) preference for links with own--type individuals ( choice-based homophily) or to the prevalence of individuals of her same type in the choice set of an individual ( opportunity-based homophily). We propose an indicator to distinguish between these effects for minority groups. This is based on the observation that, in environments with unbiased opportunities, as the relative size of the minority... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Social Networks; Choice-Based and Opportunity-Based Homophily; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D85; J11; J12. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6232 |
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| Boncinelli, Leonardo; Pin, Paolo. |
| The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It has generally a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. In this paper we show that, depending on how we define perturbations, i.e. the possible mistakes that agents can make, we can obtain very different sets of stochastically stable equilibria. In particular and non-trivially, if we assume that the only possible source of error is that of an agent contributing that stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable equilibria are those in which the maximal number of players contributes. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Networks; Best Shot Game; Stochastic Stability; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; C73; D85; H41. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96840 |
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| Dall'Asta, Luca; Pin, Paolo; Ramezanpour, Abolfazl. |
| We consider any network environment in which the “best shot game” is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A natural application of the model is one in which the action 1 is the purchase of a good, which is locally a public good, in the sense that it will be available also to neighbors. This game will typically exhibit a great multiplicity of equilibria. Imagine a social planner whose scope is to find an optimal equilibrium, i.e. one in which the number of nodes playing 1 is minimal. To find such an equilibrium is a very hard task for any non-trivial network architecture. We propose an implementable mechanism that, in the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Networks; Best Shot Game; Simulated Annealing; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C61; C63; D85; H41. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50684 |
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| Pin, Paolo. |
| The paper presents a model of network formation where every connected couple gives a contribution to the aggregate payoff, eventually discounted by their distance, and the resources are split between agents through the Myerson value. As equilibrium concept we adopt a refinement of pairwise stability. The only parameters are the number N of agents and a constant cost k for every agent to maintain any single link. This setup shows a wide multiplicity of equilibria, all of them connected, as k ranges over non trivial cases. We are able to show that, for any N, when the equilibrium is a tree (acyclical connected graph), which happens for high k, and there is no decay, the diameter of such a network never exceeds 8 (i.e. there are no two nodes with distance... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Financial Economics. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12161 |
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