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| Pingle, Mark; Tesfatsion, Leigh. |
| Experiments with real and computational agents are used to examine the impact of changing the level of a non-employment payoff on the evolution of cooperation between workers and employers participating in a sequential employment game with incomplete contracts. Workers either direct work offers to preferred employers or choose unemployment and receive the non-employment payoff. Subject to capacity limitations, employers either accept work offers from preferred workers or remain vacant and receive the non-employment payoff. Matched workers and employers participate in an employment relationship modeled as a prisoner's dilemma game. In both types of experiments, increases in the non-employment payoff result in higher unemployment and vacancy rates while... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Labor and Human Capital. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18190 |
