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| Registros recuperados: 10 | |
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| Pushkarskaya, Helen N.. |
| Three theoretical non-point water pollution (NPS) control schemes were tested repeatedly in experimental studies tax-subsidy scheme (K. Segerson, 1988), collective fining (Xepapadeas, 1991) and random fining (Xepapadeas, 1991). Camacho and Requate (2004) summarized results reported by Spraggon (2002), Vossler et al (2002), Cochard et al (2002), and Alpizar et al (2004) and replicated their experiments. This paper discusses similarity and differences among all the reported results and in particular the following two. First, both collective fining and random fining induce abatement under the target, their performance deteriorates over time and is relatively consistent over the replications. Second, tax-subsidy scheme induced abatement over the target, its... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21111 |
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| Pushkarskaya, Helen N.; Randall, Alan. |
| We offer a decentralized solution to the asymmetric information and hidden action problems in the nonpoint source (NPS) pollution case. Farmers in the same watershed generate homogeneous NPS pollution. The regulator, R, pays for (or represents a group of point-source, PS, polluters who pay for) pollution reduction credits earned by the group of the farmers. To resolve the asymmetric information problem, R is concerned with only the total level of the abatement achieved, while the group of farmers (called the Association, A), undertakes responsibility to distribute the payment so as to induce farmers to deliver abatement. We show that A can devise an optimal contract to deal with the farmers' hidden action problem. We identify the restrictions under... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19890 |
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| Pushkarskaya, Helen N.. |
| Three theoretical non-point water pollution control schemes were tested repeatedly in experimental studies tax-subsidy scheme (K. Segerson, 1988), collective fining (Xepapadeas, 1991) and random fining (Xepapadeas, 1991). Camacho and Requate (2004) summarized results reported by Spraggon (2002), Vossler et al (2002), Cochard et al (2002), and Alpizar et al (2004) and replicated their experiments. In this paper I will discuss similarity and differences among all the reported results and in particular the following two. First, both collective fining and random fining induce abatement under the target, their performance deteriorates over time, and is relatively consistent over the replications. Second, tax-subsidy scheme induced abatement over the target,... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25507 |
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| Pushkarskaya, Helen N.; Arkes, Hal; Pieratt, Jason; Bamba, Ibrahim. |
| The goal of this experimental study was to test an effectiveness of a group contract designed to control nonpoint source water pollution from farms' runoff (Pushkarskaya 2003). In particular, the regulator pays for pollution reduction credits earned by the group of the farmers, who voluntary enter the contract, and is concerned only with the total level of the abatement achieved, while the group of farmers undertakes responsibility to distribute the payment so as to induce the farmers to deliver the desired level of abatement. First round of experiments was conducted using as subjects undergraduate students from the Ohio State University, second round of experiments was conducted using as a subjects Kentucky farmers, who would be an actual subjects to... |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19309 |
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| Khantachavana, Sivalai V.; Just, David R.; Pushkarskaya, Helen N.. |
| Entrepreneurship means making discrete changes in livelihood activities that involve substantial risks to income. While the rewards may be substantial, transactions costs may make decisions irreversible. This paper draws a comparison between entrepreneurship and technology adoption. Adopting a new production technology also involves substantial risks. The economics of technology adoption is a well developed literature with many accepted and testable models. Most prominent are the theories of learning by using and learning by doing. We review the technology adoption literature, drawing out lessons for entrepreneurship research. We then apply an entrepreneurship as technology adoption model to a unique dataset collected during the tobacco buyout. The... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Entrepreneurship; Technology adoption; Tobacco buyout; Agribusiness; Risk and Uncertainty. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61296 |
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| Pushkarskaya, Helen N.; Marshall, Maria I.. |
| Our study uses the data collected during the implementation of the tobacco buyout program in Kentucky to evaluate how rural households, diverse in income, age, family structure, location, education level, and other characteristics, made a choice between annuities and a lump-sum payment. Subjects in our field experiment did not have to retire or change their employment, as did subjects in many field studies of the choice between annuities and lump-sum payments, which allowed us to evaluate the relationship between the option choice and a decision whether to exit the tobacco market. Our results suggest that while discounted utility theory gives acceptable predictions of the farmers’ behavior, other factors have to be taken into consideration. First, there... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Annuity; Family business system; Intertemporal choice; Lump sum; Tobacco buyout; Agribusiness; Consumer/Household Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Marketing; G11; H31; J10. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56647 |
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| Marshall, Maria I.; Pushkarskaya, Helen N.. |
| There are many expenditure options available to farmers who received a tobacco buyout check. We used a multinomial logit model to analyze how farmer, business, and household characteristics influenced the choice of expenditure option. We found statistically significant differences in the way farmers chose to spend their buyout money based on age, education, gender, and internet use. We also found that farmer optimism had a statistically significant impact on expenditure choice. Overall, our analysis suggests that it is important for policymakers to take into account this heterogeneity instead of treating all farmers as a homogeneous group of representative agents. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Farm Management. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9925 |
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| Registros recuperados: 10 | |
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