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| Toth, Sandor F.; Rabotyagov, Sergey S.; Ettl, Gregory J.. |
| We attempt to design a market framework (which we call ECOSEL) for private provision of forest ecosystem services. ECOSEL is a non-regulatory framework that uses a voluntary public good provision mechanism (in a form of an auction) in conjunction with a multiobjective optimization algorithm to create a market for forest ecosystem services. It is expected to be attractive to the demand side of the ecosystem service market since only Pareto-efficient bundles of services are offered for auction, and it is expected to be attractive to the supply side as well by creating a source of non-timber income for forest landowners. ECOSEL is capable of flexible response to demand for other relevant dimensions of forest-related environmental amenities such as... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49565 |
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| Kurkalova, Lyubov A.; Rabotyagov, Sergey S.. |
| This paper presents an econometric technique for circumventing the lack of individual choice data in a framework of binary choice model by utilizing aggregate choice data. The probability of observing a certain number of individuals making choice A out of the total number of individuals in a group is presented as a sum of probabilities of disjoint events, in which some individuals are picked to make choice A, and others are not. These probabilities are then used to form a likelihood function. The model, which is estimated using the method of maximum likelihood, performs favorably in an application to real discrete choice data. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Consumer/Household Economics. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22230 |
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| Rabotyagov, Sergey S.; Feng, Hongli; Kling, Catherine L.. |
| The optimal pollution permit trading system is examined when the regulator, faced with incomplete information on firms' abatement costs and delivery coefficients, seeks to minimize expected total abatement costs to meet an ex ante pollution target. Intuitively, we find that the optimal trading ratio and permit cap are set such that there will be more pollution when abatement costs are high and less pollution when abatement costs are low. Surprisingly however , even when the delivery coefficients are known with certainty, the optimal trading ratio will not necessarily equal the delivery coefficient, nor will it be optimal for the total permit quantity to equal the given pollution target. Instead, the trading ratio will tend to be larger when there is... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Delivery coefficient; Ex ante pollution target; Ex post pollution target; Permit trading; Total permit cap; Trading ratio; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21312 |
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