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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Cambini, Carlo (2) Rondi, Laura (2) Bortolotti, Bernardo (1) Spiegel, Yossi (1) Palavra-chave G31 (2) G32 (2) Investment (2) L33 (2) L51 (2) Capital Structure (1) Capital structure (1) Financial Economics (1) Government’s Political Orientation (1) L90 (1) Leverage (1) Private and State Ownership (1) Private and state ownership (1) Public Economics (1) Regulated Utilities (1) Regulated utilities (1) Regulatory Independence (1) Regulatory agencies (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2010 (1) 2007 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Regulatory Independence and Political Interference: Evidence from EU Mixed-Ownership Utilities’ Investment and Debt AgEcon Cambini, Carlo; Rondi, Laura. This paper examines the investment and financial decisions of a sample of 92 EU regulated utilities, taking into account key institutional features of EU public utilities, such as: a) regulation by agencies with various degrees of independence; b) partial ownership of the state in the regulated firm; and c) the government’s political orientation, which may ultimately influence the regulatory climate to be either more pro-firm or more pro-consumers. Our results show that regulatory independence matters for both investment and financial decisions. Investment increases under an Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA), while ownership has no effect. Leverage also increases when the IRA is in place, especially so if the regulated firm is privately controlled.... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Regulated Utilities; Investment; Capital Structure; Private and State Ownership; Regulatory Independence; Government’s Political Orientation; Financial Economics; G31; G32; L33; L51; L90. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91002 Capital Structure and Regulation: Does Ownership Matter? AgEcon Bortolotti, Bernardo; Cambini, Carlo; Rondi, Laura; Spiegel, Yossi. We construct a comprehensive panel data of 96 publicly traded European utilities over the period 1994-2005 in order to study the relationship between the capital structure of regulated firms, regulated prices, and investments, and examine if and how this interaction is affected by ownership structure. We show that firms in our sample increase their leverage after becoming regulated by an independent regulatory agency, but only if they are privately controlled. Moreover, we find that the leverage of these firms has a positive and significant effect on regulated prices, but not vice versa, and it also has a positive and significant effect on their investment levels. Our results are consistent with the theory that privately-controlled firms use leverage... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Regulated utilities; Regulatory agencies; Capital structure; Leverage; Investment; Private and state ownership; Public Economics; L51; G31; G32; L33. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7449 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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