SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Bignebat, Celine; Rouviere, Elodie.

Collective quality management systems are well known instruments to manage the quality and/or the safety of foodstuffs. They can be considered as voluntary approaches to food safety. In environmental economics some empirical studies emphasize that firms entering into a collective voluntary program behave differently because their motivations differ. To the best of our knowledge, there is no formal discussion on the effectiveness of a collective voluntary program in which firms adopt different behaviour once they entered the program. Starting from this two strand of literature, we extend the analytical framework of collective voluntary approaches considering heterogeneous firms and applying it to food safety issues. We show that according to firms...

Brokers vs. Retailers: Evidence from the French Imports Industry of Fresh Produce.

Palavras-chave: Voluntary Approaches; Food Safety; Collective Action; Heterogeneity; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Q18; L51; L81.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9441

Latouche, Karine; Rouviere, Elodie.

There is burgeoning discussion in the literature about trade intermediaries and more precisely about their specific role in trade. Using very original data, our article sheds light on the behavior of trade intermediaries when importing fresh fruits and vegetables in France. To do so, we distinguish the shares of direct and indirect imports of fresh produce respectively operated through French brokers and through French retailers. Accounting for the bounded nature of the share, we show that brokers are more likely than retailers to operate in small countries with high variable costs.

Tipo: Presentation

Palavras-chave: Mporters; Intermediation; Fresh produce; International Trade.; Industrial Organization; International Relations/Trade; F23; Q17; Q18.

Ano: 2012

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123331

COMPETITION VS. QUALITY IN AN INDUSTRY WITH IMPERFECT TRACEABILITY

Brokers vs. Retailers: Evidence from the French Imports Industry of Fresh Produce.

Palavras-chave: Entry; Externality; Minimum Quality Standard; Quality; Agricultural and Food Policy; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Food Security and Poverty; Health Economics and Policy; L15; L5.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116407

Latouche, Karine; Rouviere, Elodie.

There is little discussion in the literature about trade intermediaries because data is rare. Using very original data, our article sheds light on the behavior of trade intermediaries when importing fresh fruit and vegetables in France. To do so, we distinguish among direct and indirect imports respectively operated through brokers or retailers. We then investigate the impact of country level data on the share of indirect/direct flows of imports by country of origin at the 8-digit level that enter the french market. We show that brokers are more likely to operate in context when fixed and variable costs to trade are high whereas retailers are sensitive to tariffs and product sensitivity.

Small is Beautiful? Firm's Size, Prevention & Food Safety.

Palavras-chave: Agribusiness; International Relations/Trade; Q17.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114398

Voluntary approaches to food safety: New insights

The European General Food Law of 2005 and the newly promulgated FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FFSMA) of 2010 ask all food operators to implement preventive efforts. In this article, we explore the link between firm’s size and preventive efforts. We show two main results. First, when there is no cross-contamination, small firms will provide higher preventive efforts than large firms. When there is crosscontamination, the effort-size curve may have a "inverted-U" shape. From our results we can argue that when implementing or enforcing food safety regulations, public authorities should consider both firms size and food safety hazard.

Tipo: Presentation

Palavras-chave: Prevention effort; Firm size; Food safety; Agribusiness; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Industrial Organization; Risk and Uncertainty; Q18; L15; L5.

Ano: 2012

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123410

Fares, M'Hand; Rouviere, Elodie.

Food safety economists have raised numerous questions according to the emergence and the multiplication of safety quality management system within the food supply chain. However, few research deal with the voluntary implementation by firms of these systems (Segerson, 1999; Venturini, 2003; Noelke- Caswell, 2000). Our paper aims to develop a unified analytical framework of these research. We obtain three results. First, in a market model when the mandatory threat is strong, the voluntary adoption of safety measures is an equilibrium without need of the cost differential assumption (Segerson, 1999) nor of a reputation effect (Venturini, 2003). Second, when the mandatory threat is weak the reputation effect and the rule of liability could induce the voluntary...

Objectiveness in the Market for Third-Party Certification: Does market structure matter?

Palavras-chave: Food Safety; Voluntary Approaches; Supply Chain; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10081

Anders, Sven M.; Souza Monteiro, Diogo M.; Rouviere, Elodie.

The globalization of trade in high quality foods is stimulating the development of international food standards and certification systems. Third-party certification as evolved as a means of ensuring that product information and signals on quality and safety attributes are sound and reliable. Certification can only provide credible market signals if it operates objectively and independently. This paper investigates the potential trade-off between certifiers objectivity and the level of competition in the rapidly expanding market for third-party certification of quality foods. Based on a theoretical supply chain framework a nested panel analysis is applied to a set of accredited certifiers for the EurepGAP fruits and vegetables standard. Our results...

Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Safety Standard

Palavras-chave: Third-party certification; Objectiveness; Market structure; Nested panel analysis; EurepGAP; Marketing.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7894

This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a barrier to entry.

Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard

Palavras-chave: Collective Reputation; Entry; Minimum Quality Standard; Institutional and Behavioral Economics.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44465