SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Gautier, Pascal; Soubeyran, Raphael.

We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share decreases the longer it stays in power. Parties chances of winning do not converge and, when the median voter is moderate enough, no party can maintain itself in power for ever. Finally, the more parties are specialized and the more public policies have long-term effects, the more political cycles are likely to occur.

Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?

Palavras-chave: Political Economy.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12194

Soubeyran, Raphael.

Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? If the answer to these questions were positive, as suggested in recent work (Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Aragones and Palfrey (2002), Groseclose (1999), and Aragones and Palfrey (2003)), this would mean that extremist candidates are bad politicians. We consider a two candidates electoral competition over public consumption, with a two dimensional policy space and two dimensions of candidates heterogeneity. In this setting, we show that the conclusion depends on candidates relative competences over the two public goods and distinguish...

Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters Turnout?

Palavras-chave: Political Economy.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12191

Soubeyran, Raphael.

We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players, contestants are allowed to reduce the effort of the opponent. Defence increases ones chance of winning while attack annihilates the defence of the opponent. This model has many applications like political campaigning, wars, competition among lobbies, job promotion competitions, or sport contests. We study the general model of contest with attacks and defence and propose an application to negative political campaigns, where two candidates arbitrate between disparaging their opponent or enhancing their own image. We propose...

The Pace of Technology Transfer in Anticipation of Joint Venture Breakup

Palavras-chave: Political Economy.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12199

Van Long, Ngo; Soubeyran, Antoine; Soubeyran, Raphael.

This paper studies the properties of joint-venture relationship between a technologically advanced multinational firm and a local firm operating in a developing economy where the ability to enforce contracts is weak. We formulate a dynamic model of principal-agent relationship in which at any point of time the local firm can quit without legal penalties. An early breakup may be prevented if the multinational designs a suitable scheme in which both the pace and aggregate amount of technology transfer deviate from the first-best, and a suitable flow of side payments to encourage the local firm to stay longer.

When Inertia Generates Political Cycles

Palavras-chave: Technology Transfer; Joint Venture; Developing Economies; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; O3.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55329

Soubeyran, Raphael.

We propose a simple infinite horizon of repeated elections with two candidates. Furthermore we suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough, no party can win the election a consecutive infinite number of times.

COMPETITION VS. QUALITY IN AN INDUSTRY WITH IMPERFECT TRACEABILITY

Palavras-chave: Political Economy.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12192

Small is Beautiful? Firm's Size, Prevention & Food Safety.

Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation

Palavras-chave: Entry; Externality; Minimum Quality Standard; Quality; Agricultural and Food Policy; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Food Security and Poverty; Health Economics and Policy; L15; L5.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116407

Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Safety Standard

The European General Food Law of 2005 and the newly promulgated FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FFSMA) of 2010 ask all food operators to implement preventive efforts. In this article, we explore the link between firm’s size and preventive efforts. We show two main results. First, when there is no cross-contamination, small firms will provide higher preventive efforts than large firms. When there is crosscontamination, the effort-size curve may have a "inverted-U" shape. From our results we can argue that when implementing or enforcing food safety regulations, public authorities should consider both firms size and food safety hazard.

Tipo: Presentation

Palavras-chave: Prevention effort; Firm size; Food safety; Agribusiness; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Industrial Organization; Risk and Uncertainty; Q18; L15; L5.

Ano: 2012

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123410

Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard

This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a barrier to entry.

Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation

Palavras-chave: Collective Reputation; Entry; Minimum Quality Standard; Institutional and Behavioral Economics.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44465