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Output-Based Refunding of Emission Payments: Theory, Distribution of Costs, and International Experience AgEcon
Sterner, Thomas; Hoglund, Lena.
In this paper, we discuss the effect of refunding environmental charges. Taxes often are resisted by polluters because they imply both abatement and tax costs. We show that when charges are refunded, the incentives for abatement are essentially the same as for a tax, but the output reduction that often accompanies a tax scheme is forgone. We describe and examine the refund emissions payment (REP) scheme as a policy instrument for emissions abatement and compare it with taxes and permits with regard to allocative properties, distribution of costs, property rights, and, consequently, the politics of implementation. As an empirical example, the Swedish charge on nitrogen oxides is analyzed.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Refunded charge; Incentived-based environmental policy; Air pollution; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; Q25; H23.
Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10670
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Monitoring and Enforcement: Is Two-Tier Regulation Robust? AgEcon
Kathuria, Vinish; Sterner, Thomas.
The regulation of industrial pollution is clearly difficult in a rapidly industrializing, low-income setting. In addition to the general lack of resources for monitoring and enforcement, authorities must deal with the asymmetric nature of the information and multiple nonpoint sources of pollution. In this study we look at efforts to regulate chemical plants in Ankleshwar, in the Indian state of Gujarat. The plants are located in an industrial estate, which provides interesting preconditions for a form of two-tier regulation, in which an industry association becomes an intermediary between the government and individual firms: it monitors its members' pollution and promotes compliance with the government's environmental regulations. The Indian agency...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Industrial estate; Two-tier monitoring; Common property resource; Industry association; Nonpoint sources of pollution; Political Economy; Q25; P28; K42.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10669
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Bioeconomic Model of Community Incentives for Wildlife Management Before and After CAMPFIRE AgEcon
Fischer, Carolyn; Muchapondwa, Edwin; Sterner, Thomas.
This paper formulates a bioeconomic model to analyze community incentives for wildlife management under benefit-sharing programs like the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. Two agents influence the wildlife stock: a parks agency determines hunting quotas, and a local community chooses to either aid or discourage outside poachers. Wildlife generates revenues from hunting licenses and tourism; it also intrudes on local agriculture. We consider two benefit-sharing regimes: shares of wildlife tourism rents and shares of hunting licenses. Resource sharing does not necessarily improve community welfare or incentives for wildlife conservation. Results depend on the exact design of the benefit shares, the size of...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Bioeconomic; CAMPFIRE; Community; Poaching; Wildlife; Benefit sharing; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; H41; Q20.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10717
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Implementation of Policy Instruments for Chlorinated Solvents: A Comparison of Design Standards, Bans, and Taxes to Phase Out Trichloroethylene AgEcon
Slunge, Daniel; Sterner, Thomas.
This paper studies the Swedish prohibition of the hazardous solvent Trichloroethylene (TCE). Sweden is alone in completely prohibiting its use. The ban has been at best a partial success and illustrates the dilemmas of policymaking. Use has declined but not stopped, largely because the decision to ban TCE was challenged in the courts. Recently, the EU Court of Justice decided in favor of Sweden's right to have a ban. This article analyzes abatement cost data to show that the cost of replacing TCE is low for most plants, although there appear to be a few firms for which it may be quite high. A cross-country comparison indicates that the Swedish ban was less effective than the very strict technical requirements in Germany or the tax used in Norway. A tax (or...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Hazardous chemicals; Regulation; Environmental tax; Solvents; Environmental Economics and Policy; D62; L50; Q28; K32.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10516
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Public Disclosure of Industrial Pollution: The PROPER Approach for Indonesia? AgEcon
Lopez, Jorge Garcia; Sterner, Thomas; Afsah, Shakeb.
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the Program for Pollution Control Evaluation and Rating (PROPER) in Indonesia. PROPER, the first major public disclosure program in the developing world, was launched in June 1995; though it collapsed in 1998 with the Asian financial crisis, it is currently being revived. There have been claims of success for this pioneering scheme, yet little formal analysis has been undertaken. We analyze changes in emissions concentrations (mg/L) using panel data techniques with plant-level data for participating firms and a control group. The results show that there was indeed a positive response to PROPER, especially among firms with poor environmental compliance records. The response was immediate, and firms pursued further...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental policy; Pollution control; Public disclosure; Asia; Indonesia; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10482
Registros recuperados: 5
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