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| Tarui, Nori; Polasky, Stephen. |
| We analyze a model of environmental regulation with learning about environmental damages and endogenous choice of emissions abatement technology by a polluting firm. We compare environmental policy under discretion, in which policy is updated upon learning new information, versus under rules, in which policy is not updated. When investment in abatement technology is made prior to the resolution of uncertainty, neither discretion nor rules with either taxes or standards achieve an efficient solution. When there is little uncertainty, rules are superior to discretion because discretionary policy gives the firm an incentive to distort investment in order to influence future regulation. However, when uncertainty is large, discretion is superior to rules... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21911 |
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| Tarui, Nori. |
| This paper explores the efficiency of tradable permit markets for stock pollutants. With uncertainty about the future stock level or damages, a market with banking and borrowing is inferior, in terms of efficiency, compared to a market without banking and borrowing if the regulator commits to an initial allocation of permits. This result occurs because, with banking and borrowing and commitment, the regulator needs to specify the total allowable amount of emission over time at the initial time period before the uncertainty with the pollution stock is resolved. An alternative banking and borrowing scheme is proposed, where the regulator can update the allocation of permits to firms over time and achieve the efficient pollution accumulation. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14431 |
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| Tarui, Nori. |
| This paper explores the efficiency of tradable permit markets for stock pollutants. With uncertainty about the future stock level or damages, a market with banking and borrowing is inferior, in terms of efficiency, compared to a market without banking and borrowing if the regulator commits to an initial allocation of permits. This result occurs because, with banking and borrowing and commitment, the regulator needs to specify the total allowable amount of emission over time at the initial time period before the uncertainty with the pollution stock is resolved. An alternative banking and borrowing scheme is proposed, where the regulator can update the allocation of permits to firms over time and achieve the efficient pollution accumulation. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; Q25); Q25. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19752 |
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