Home Itens selecionados Provedores de dados OAI Créditos Sobre Ajuda

			Busca avançada
	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Tavoni, Alessandro (2) Levin, Simon (1) Schluter, Maja (1) Palavra-chave Agent-based Simulation (1) Aspiration level (1) Behavioral economics (1) C72 (1) C73 (1) C91 (1) Common Pool Resource (1) Cooperation (1) Coupled Socio-resource Dynamics (1) D01 (1) D63 (1) D70 (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Evolutionary Game Theory (1) Experimental economics (1) Fairness (1) Impulse balance (1) Inequity aversion (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) Ostracism (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2010 (1) 2009 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Incorporating Fairness Motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Quantal Response Equilibrium Concepts: An Application to 2x2 Games AgEcon Tavoni, Alessandro. Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts which perform better empirically; one such example is the impulse balance equilibrium (Selten, Chmura, 2008), which introduces a psychological reference point to which players compare the available payoff allocations. This paper is concerned with advancing two new, empirically sound, concepts: equity-driven impulse balance equilibrium (EIBE) and equity-driven quantal response equilibrium (EQRE): both introduce a distributive reference point to the corresponding... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Fairness; Inequity aversion; Aspiration level; Impulse balance; Quantal Response; Behavioral economics; Experimental economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C91; D01; D63. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50740 The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management AgEcon Tavoni, Alessandro; Schluter, Maja; Levin, Simon. This paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource (CPR), we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Cooperation; Social Norm; Ostracism; Common Pool Resource; Evolutionary Game Theory; Replicator Equation; Agent-based Simulation; Coupled Socio-resource Dynamics; Environmental Economics and Policy; C73; Q20; D70. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96843 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610 Política de Privacidade Área restrita		Embrapa Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n° Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901 Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco