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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Gallerani, Vittorio (2) Raggi, Meri (2) Viaggi, Davide (2) Fraser, Rob W. (1) Palavra-chave Agri-Environmental Policy (3) Environmental Economics and Policy (3) Auction (2) Q15 (2) Q18 (2) Agribusiness (1) Agricultural Finance (1) Agricultural and Food Policy (1) Contract (1) Contract Duration (1) Information asymmetries. (1) Information asymmetry (1) Moral Hazard (1) Q58 (1) Targeting (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Article (1) Ano 2011 (1) 2010 (1) 2008 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF CONTRACT AUCTIONS TO AEP'S EFFICIENCY AgEcon Gallerani, Vittorio; Raggi, Meri; Viaggi, Davide. Agri-Environmetal Policy (AEP) application raised a wide debate about the determination of payment levels and the efficiency of the economic instruments used. In particular, some aspects support the hypothesis of relevant rents due to an overcompensation of farmers� compliance costs. A policy tool suitable for improving the efficiency of AEP can be the adoption of auctions mechanisms in contract allocation. In theory, in an auction mechanism, the farmers have incentives to reveal their compliance costs, helping to reduce the information rents and increase cost-effectiveness. A crucial problem therefore arises from the uneven distribution of information between landowners and the public administration. Auctions mechanism can be useful in reducing... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Auction; Agri-Environmental Policy; Information asymmetries.; Agricultural Finance; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6660 Evaluating the potential contribution of contract auctions to Agri-Environmental Policy efficiency: A simulation model for Emilia-Romagna (Italy) AgEcon Viaggi, Davide; Raggi, Meri; Gallerani, Vittorio. Auctions are a potentially suitable policy tool for increasing the efficiency of Agri- Environmental Schemes (AES) through an improved allocation of contracts. In theory, through the auction mechanism, farmers have incentives to reveal their compliance costs, helping to reduce information rents and increase policy cost-effectiveness. The aim of this paper is to simulate the potential contribution of auction mechanisms to the efficiency of AES in Emilia-Romagna (Italy). The results show advantages for auctions compared with traditional flat rate payments based on average compliance costs. However, their performance is worse than flat payments based on marginal compliance costs. Tipo: Article Palavras-chave: Auction; Contract; Agri-Environmental Policy; Information asymmetry; Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q15; Q18. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118671 Moral Hazard, Targeting and Contract Duration in Agri-Environmental Policy AgEcon Fraser, Rob W.. This paper extends the multi-period agri-environmental contract model of Fraser (2004) so that it contains a more realistic specification of the inter-temporal penalties for non-compliance, and therefore of the inter-temporal moral hazard problem in agri-environmental policy design. On this basis it is shown that a farmer will have an unambiguous preference for cheating early over cheating late in the contract period based on differences in the expected cost of compliance. It is then shown how the principal can make use of this unambiguous preference to target monitoring resources intertemporally, and in so doing, to encourage full contract duration compliance. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Moral Hazard; Contract Duration; Agri-Environmental Policy; Targeting; Agribusiness; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q15; Q18; Q58. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108795 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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