|
|
|
|
|
| Beckmann, Volker; Boger, Silke. |
| The paper investigates theoretically and empirically the role of courts for contract enforcement in transition agriculture. In a survey of 306 Polish hog farmers conducted in 1999, only 38.5% of them reported to believe that they could use courts to enforce contracts with their most important customer. Furthermore, those who believe the legal system could be used would accept significant financial losses before taking action. We develop a theoretical model, based on the costs and benefits of court enforcement, which captures the boundary between contracts to be regarded as "enforceable" and "not-enforceable" and, simultaneously, the threshold of taking legal action. The empirical analysis strongly supports our model: (1) the farmers' responds can be... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural contracts; Contract enforcement; Courts; Transition; Political Economy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25878 |
| |
|
|
| Key, Nigel D.. |
| A farmer's decision to contract or produce independently depends on the distribution of income under both arrangements, and on attributes associated with both business arrangements. Risk-averse farmers should be willing to pay a risk premium for the reduction in price risk provided by a contract. Farmers with a preference for "autonomy" should be willing to pay a premium for certain attributes associated with independent production, such as the right to make management decisions and own the commodity they produce. The benefits to growers from contracting (such as risk reduction) may be over-estimated if the non-pecuniary benefits enjoyed by independent producers are not accounted for. This study uses national survey data to estimate the risk premium, the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural contracts; Autonomy; Nonpecuniary benefits; Risk; Farm Management. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19688 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
