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| Registros recuperados: 25 | |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe. |
| We study incentives for information sharing (about uncertain future demand for final output) among firms in imperfectly competitive markets for farm output. Information sharing generally leads to increases in expected total welfare but may reduce expected firm profits. Even when expected firm profits increase, information sharing does not represent equilibrium behavior because firms face a prisoner?s dilemma in which it is privately rational for each firm to withhold information, given that other firms report truthfully. This equilibrium can be overcome if firms commit to simultaneously reporting their information and if reports are verifiable. We argue that agricultural bargaining associations serve both these roles. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural markets; Bargaining; Imperfect competition; Information; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18576 |
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| Oyewumi, Olubukola Ayodeju. |
| One of the fundamental characteristics of a well functioning market is the ability to transmit useful information to decision makers at the micro-level, which will ultimately culminate in the development of effective macro-level policies. A key assumption in economics is that market information is readily available to role players in business and marketing. In reality however, farmers in the developing world, unlike their developed countries counterpart, are still faced with the challenge of accessing credible market information. Market information is an essential component of agricultural production, distribution and marketing. The availability of timely and accurate market information to farmers by means of fast and effective modern information... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Information and communication technology (ICT); Agricultural markets; Market information; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8196 |
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| Nazlioglu, Saban; Erdem, Ekrem. |
| This study analyzes the impacts of Turkey’s integration into the EU on price, production, consumption, and self-sufficiency in the selected agricultural markets (wheat, maize, sugar, milk, beef, lamb, and poultry). The study also examines the welfare and the income distribution impacts of the integration. A partial equilibrium model, Modéle Internationale Simplifié de Simulation (MISS), is used to simulate the impacts of the integration on the agricultural markets and Gini coefficients are calculated to examine the income distribution effects. The results show that the integration has substantial impacts on the selected agricultural markets in Turkey and deteriorates the distribution of income among the selected Turkish producers. |
| Tipo: Article |
Palavras-chave: Economic integration; Agricultural markets; Impact analysis; Income distribution; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118575 |
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| Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe. |
| This paper identifies market and commodity characteristics that seem to support successful cooperative bargaining in markets for farm output. Bargaining is not just about increasing prices paid to farmers; indeed, although there is very little empirical research that addresses the issue, what evidence does exist suggests that cooperative bargaining has very little direct influence on price. Nevertheless, the price negotiation process may be useful in itself as a form of price discovery in markets where there is uncertainty about market supply and demand conditions, and bargaining associations can play an important role in ensuring contract reliability. These and other benefits must be weighed against the organizational and ongoing operational costs of a... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural markets; Cooperative bargaining; Imperfect competition; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18526 |
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| Banaszak, Ilona. |
| The main question posed in the paper asks why do some cooperative arrangements in agricultural markets survive and succeed and others fail? We define success and factors affecting success of cooperation using transaction costs theory and game theory. Transaction costs theory provides insights on comparative advantage of one form of organization versus others and proposes, while game theory focuses on interdependencies between partners entering the arrangements. Data were collected from 62 Polish farmer cooperative organizations called producer groups. The main aim of those organizations was to organize joint sales of output produced individually by their members. Some of the groups were functioning effectively while others that had disbanded or were no... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cooperation; Agricultural markets; Producer groups; Poland; Agribusiness; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7837 |
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| Registros recuperados: 25 | |
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