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| Kamau, Mercy W.; Burger, Kees; Giller, Ken E.; Kuyvenhoven, Arie. |
| This paper evaluates how efficiently farm households allocate labor between farm and off-farm activities. It estimates farm and off-farm labor supply functions to determine the factors that influence labor allocation. Both the shadow wage and the off-farm wage rate are included as regressors in the supply functions. The study reveals that, on average, farm households are inefficient, but when linked to labor markets their productivity and internal efficiency increase. The decision to sell labor is influenced by location, and off-farm employment is difficult to find, particularly for the better educated. Interventions should aim to increase opportunities for off-farm employment for persons with skills or with higher than the basic level of education, and to... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Labor market; Allocative efficiency; Labor supply; Kenya; Labor and Human Capital. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56926 |
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| Farida, Moe; Ahmadi-Esfahani, Fredoun Z.. |
| This paper seeks to investigate the interaction between favoritism and allocative efficiency. The issue of whether corruption distorts allocative efficiency in a bribery game under a pre-existing environment of alleged favoritism is considered. It is demonstrated that if there is no unambiguous favoritism, observed favoritism in bribery game may disrupt allocative efficiency. A bribery game under corruption and favoritism is developed. The model and some possible equilibria are discussed. A simple numerical example from Lebanon is also presented. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Favoritism; Allocative efficiency; Bribery game.. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/48156 |
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