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| Walls, Margaret. |
| Solid waste management services are contracted out to private firms in many U.S. communities. Household waste collection, transport, and disposal are relatively straightforward services to define within the terms of a contract. The addition of recycling, however, significantly complicates matters. How should contracts be structured to provide incentives for recycling? Who should own key facilities, such as recyclable materials processing facilities? Should a separate contract for processing and sale of materials be used, or should these services be provided by government employees or purely private markets? These questions are addressed in this study using the principal-agent framework and the theory of incomplete contracts in economics. I explain stylized... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Incentive contracts; Asset specificity; Principal-agent models; Waste collection; Recycling; Environmental Economics and Policy; L33; L14; Q2. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10707 |
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| Hudson, Darren. |
| Contracting in agriculture has increased over the past several decades. This activity has heightened concerns about concentration, market power, and farmer welfare. The purpose of this paper is to describe some of the underlying motivations for contracting and to highlight some of the trade-offs made when making contracting decisions. These illustrations are intended to inform readers of the economic conditions for contracting, not provide empirical evidence of their implications, costs, or benefits. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Contracting; Asset specificity; Transaction costs; Farm Management. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15789 |
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