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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (6) Autor Bressan, Aureliano Angel (1) Bressan, Valéria Gama Fully (1) Calzolari, Giacomo (1) Catro, D. Fuentes (1) Chavez, Carlos A. (1) Jayet, Pierre-Alain (1) Menapace, Luisa (1) Moschini, GianCarlo (1) Pandey, Vivek (1) Ross, Brent (1) Rotillon, Gilles (1) Scarpa, Carlo (1) Shanoyan, Aleksan (1) Stranlund, John K. (1) Villena, Mauricio G. (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Asymmetric Information (6) Environmental Economics and Policy (3) Agribusiness (2) D82 (2) L51 (2) Agency Theory (1) Agricultural Finance (1) Cellulosic Ethanol (1) Certification (1) Commons (1) Competition (1) Compliance (1) Conglomerate Firms (1) Contracts (1) Corporate Governance (1) D23 (1) D86 (1) Dynamics (1) Emissions Taxes (1) Enforcement (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (3) Working or Discussion Paper (2) Journal Article (1) Ano 2010 (2) 2009 (1) 2008 (1) 2007 (1) 2000 (1) País United States (6) Idioma Inglês (5) Português (1)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 6 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Quality Certification by Geographical Indications, Trademarks and Firm Reputation AgEcon Menapace, Luisa; Moschini, GianCarlo. We study firm reputation as a mechanism to assure product quality in perfectly competitive markets in a context in which both certification and trademarks are available. Shapiro’s (1983) model of reputation is extended to reflect both collective and firm-specific reputations, and this framework is used to study certification and trademarks for food products with a regional identity, known as geographical indications (GIs). Our model yields two primary results. First, in markets with asymmetric information and moral hazard problems, credible certification schemes reduce the cost of establishing reputation and lead to welfare gains compared to a situation in which only private trademarks are available. Hence, certification improves the ability of reputation... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Asymmetric Information; Certification; Geographical Indications; Quality; Reputation; Environmental Economics and Policy; D23; D82; L14; L15; Q1. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61778 Governance Issues in the Principal-Agent Framework: Producing Cellulosic Ethanol in Michigan AgEcon Pandey, Vivek; Shanoyan, Aleksan; Ross, Brent. This article analyzes the incentives and compensation problems faced by cellulosic ethanol producer and logging firms and the consequent impact on the organization of the wood based cellulosic ethanol industry in the US. The success of this relationship is central to setting up the biofuel industry in Michigan and in the US at large. The theoretical results indicate that specification contract under the principal-agent framework is of limited utility due to’ metering’ problem when the principal contracts with multiple agents for the supply of feedstock.. Alternative arrangements including JVs have the potential to provide close to first best solutions. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Principal-Agent; Cellulosic Ethanol; Michigan; Multiple agents; Asymmetric Information; Agribusiness; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D82; D86; L23; L24; Q42. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61362 On Regulation and Competition: Pros and Cons of a Diversified Monopolist AgEcon Calzolari, Giacomo; Scarpa, Carlo. We study the regulation of a firm which supplies a regulated service while also operating in a competitive, unregulated sector. If the firm conducts its activities in the two markets jointly, it enjoys economies of scope whose size is the firm’s private information, unknown either to the regulator or to the rival firms. We characterize the unregulated market outcome (with price and quantity competition) and optimal regulation that involves an informational externality to the competitors. Although joint conduct of the activities generates scope economies, it also entails private information, so that regulation is less efficient and the unregulated market too may be adversely affected. Nevertheless, we show that allowing the firm to integrate productions is... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Regulation; Competition; Asymmetric Information; Conglomerate Firms; Multiutility; Scope Economies; Informational Externality; Financial Economics; L51; L43; L52. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52543 The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly AgEcon Stranlund, John K.; Chavez, Carlos A.; Villena, Mauricio G.. We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm. This holds whether or not regulators have complete information about firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring them for compliance, or the costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Moreover, ignoring several unrealistic special cases, optimality requires discriminatory emissions taxes except when regulators are unable to observe firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring individual firms, or any firm-specific characteristic that is known to be jointly distributed... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions Taxes; Monitoring; Asymmetric Information; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7387 EXISTE DIFERENÇA ENTRE A RENTABILIDADE DAS AÇÕES DAS EMPRESAS QUE ADOTAM GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA COM RELAÇÃO ÀS EMPRESAS DO MERCADO TRADICIONAL? AgEcon Bressan, Valéria Gama Fully; Bressan, Aureliano Angel. The study verifies, between march 2005 and march 2006, if there is any difference between the stock yields of a sample of companies listed in Bovespa that adopt the principles of Corporate Governance, in different levels, in relation to the companies of the traditional market. The data were extracted from Economatica’s database; 130 non-financial companies with higher liquidity stock were selected, of which 65 adopt Corporate Governance practices, and 65 operate according to the traditional market. To conduct the study, the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Student’s t test were used. The results show that the mean yield of companies that adopt different Corporate Governance levels was superior to that of the companies which did not adopt these practices.... Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Stock Yield; Corporate Governance; Agency Theory; Asymmetric Information; Agribusiness; Agricultural Finance. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60711 Managing a Common Renewable Resource in Asymmetric Information AgEcon Catro, D. Fuentes; Jayet, Pierre-Alain; Rotillon, Gilles. The clear definition of property rights is not a sufficient condition to prevent congestion effects in commons. In this paper we present how interesting can be the coordination among owners in the preservation of the common good. Our approach takes into account economic dynamics and incentive mechanisms in a hidden information context. We consider a natural resource which is being used up for a continuum of producers on a common property regime. We also consider that each producer has an individual performance index which is a hidden information of the rest of players. We introduce coordination in the sense of a global maximization of the joint profit. If there is no coordination among the producers, their behavior leads to complete rent dissipation.... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Commons; Natural Resources; Dynamics; Asymmetric Information; Contracts; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24893 Registros recuperados: 6 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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