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Registros recuperados: 42
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Was There a Credit Crunch in Namibia Between 1996-2000? AgEcon
Ikhide, Sylvanus.
Commercial bank credit is a useful tool for promoting economic growth especially at the early stages of development. It has been observed that between 1996 and the early part of 2000, the growth rate of real credit to the private sector declined significantly in Namibia. This period coincided with observed strong demand for commercial bank loans. There has therefore been public discourse on the possibility of a restriction in the supply of credit by commercial banks and hence the occurrence of a credit crunch in the economy since commercial bank lending capacity did not fall. This paper attempts to provide some evidence in this regard by examining the main determinants of commercial bank credit in the economy and ascertaining if credit has been demand or...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Africa; Namibia; Credit crunch; Asymmetric information; Economic growth; Financial Economics; E51.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43995
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Utilizing Contingent Claims to Improve the Management of CAFOs AgEcon
Gramig, Benjamin M.; Skees, Jerry R.; Black, J. Roy.
We propose a market-based approach to reducing the environmental risk posed by concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs). The dual problems of hidden information and hidden action faced by policymakers are considered alongside the competing incentives faced by the CAFO manager in a multiple principal-agent setting. A new approach that uses insurance-like contracts is introduced by use of the specific example of a swine operation with a lagoon-based manure management system. Index-based contingent claims contracts in tandem with third-party auditing and waste hauling options are introduced as a complement to regulatory frameworks designed to reduce negative externalities from production.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Animal feeding operations; Asymmetric information; Environmental risk; Insurance; Public policy; Regulation; D82; G22; L51; Q18; Q25; Q28.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43346
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Controlling a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Capital and Asymmetric Information AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Zhang, Jiangfeng.
Non-strategic firms with rational expectations make investment and emissions decisions. The investment rule depends on firms' beliefs about future emissions policies. We compare emissions taxes and quotas when the (strategic) regulator and (nonstrategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov Perfect decision rules. Emissions taxes create a secondary distortion at the investment stage, unless a particular condition holds; emissions quotas do not create a secondary distortion. We solve a linear-quadratic model calibrated to represent the problem of controlling greenhouse gasses. The endogeneity of abatement capital favors taxes, and it increases abatement.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Pollution control; Investment; Asymmetric information; Rational expectations; Choice of instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; D8; H21; Q28.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25071
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The Value of Third-Party Certification of Preconditioning Claims at Iowa Feeder Cattle Auctions AgEcon
Bulut, Harun; Lawrence, John D..
After controlling a variety of feeder cattle characteristics and market and sale conditions in Iowa feeder auctions, the price premiums for preconditioning claims (vaccinations and minimum 30 days of weaning) with and without third-party certification (TPC) are estimated as $6.12/cwt and $3.35/cwt, respectively. These premiums differ statistically (p<0.0001), and their difference exceeds the average participation cost of TPC ($1/cwt). This indicates that TPC is valued in the market to credibly signal preconditioning investment under asymmetric information.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Feeder cattle auctions; Quality; Signalling; Third-party certification; Q11; Q12; Q13; C23.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37052
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An Interdisciplinary Approach to White-collar Crime in the Food Sector AgEcon
Hirschauer, Norbert; Musshoff, Oliver; Scheerer, Sebastian.
The probability that buyers are deceived with regard to the quality or safety of purchased products (moral hazard) increases with the profits which suppliers can earn through opportunistic behaviour. It decreases with the probability and level of losses that result from disclosure of malpractice. It also decreases with protective factors rooted in the suppliers' social contexts - such as values, emotional bonds etc. - that shield them from yielding to economic temptations. This paper describes how a systematic analysis of economic incentives and social context factors can be provided through an interdisciplinary approach which combines the analytical powers of microeconomics (game theory) and criminology (control theories). The approach is discussed with...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Behavioural food risks; Control theories; Game theory; Moral hazard; Opportunistic malpractice; Agribusiness; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A13; K32; K42.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25688
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Why Don't Lenders Finance High-Return Technological Change in Developing-Country Agriculture? AgEcon
Blackman, Allen.
Most of the literature attributes credit constraints in small-farm developing-country agriculture to the variability of returns to investment in this sector. But the literature does not fully explain lenders. reluctance to finance investments in technologies that provide both higher average and less variable returns. To fill this gap, this article develops an information-theoretic credit market model with endogenous technology choice. The model demonstrates that lenders may refuse to finance any investment in a riskless high-return technology--regardless of the interest rate they are offered--when they are imperfectly informed about loan applicants, time preferences and, therefore, about their propensities to default intentionally in order to finance...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Agriculture; Asymmetric information; Credit; Developing country; Technology adoption; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; O12; O16; O33; Q14; D82.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10886
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Quality Ambiguity and the Market Mechanism for Credence Goods AgEcon
Benner, Dietrich.
With credence goods consumers cannot judge actual quality neither before purchase (ex ante) nor after purchase (ex post). Trust has to replace own examination and verification. Applying Choquet-Expected Utility theory, ageneral model of credence goods is developed wich takes the problem of trust explicitly in its view and generalizes the problem of quality uncertainty on the 'market for lemmons' of Akerlof (1970) to 'quality ambiguity' with credence goods. The model shows the market mechanism only performing well in providing credence goods when consumers' trust in given information is not too low. With trust too low, sellers of credence good will be driven out of the market by trust induced adverse selection. In market equilibrium prices will always be...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Credence goods; Asymmetric information; Quality ambiguity; Quality uncertainty; Adverse selection; Ambiguity; Choquet expected utility; Agricultural and Food Policy; Marketing; C72; D81; D82.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98639
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MODELLING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CROSS-COMPLIANCE UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AgEcon
Bartolini, Fabio; Gallerani, Vittorio; Raggi, Meri; Viaggi, Davide.
The effects of cross-compliance depend on the strategies of participation/compliance of farmers, as well as on the ability of public administration to design appropriate mechanisms of control and sanctions. The objective of this paper is to present a reference framework for the analysis of cross-compliance under asymmetric information and to test the empirical relevance of the problem. The methodology is applied to a case study represented by the province of Bologna (Italy). The results show that, in the present conditions of control and sanctions, only a small share of farms is interested in complying with cross-compliance. The profitability of the choice of compliance/noncompliance depends mainly on the amount of single farm payment entitlements compared...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Cross-compliance; Asymmetric information; Single farm payment; Agricultural Finance; Farm Management; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6670
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Green industrial policy: trade and theory AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Stevenson, Megan.
This paper studies the reality and the potential for green industrial policy. We provide a summary of the green industrial policies, broadly understood, for five countries. We then consider the relation between green industrial policies and trade disputes, emphasizing the Brazil-US dispute involving ethanol and the broader US-China dispute. The theory of public policy provides many lessons for green industrial policy. We select four of these lessons, involving the Green Paradox, the choice of quantities versus prices with endogenous investment, the coordination issues arising from emissions control, and the ability of green industrial policies to promote cooperation in reducing a global public bad like carbon emissions.
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Green industrial policy; Trade conflicts; Green paradox; Asymmetric information; Coordination games; Participation games; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; F13; F18; H21; H23.
Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123637
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Determining Project-Based Emissions Baselines with Incomplete Information AgEcon
Fischer, Carolyn.
Project-based mechanisms for emissions reductions credits, like the Clean Development Mechanism, pose important challenges for policy design because of several inherent characteristics. Participation is voluntary. Evaluating reductions requires assigning a baseline for a counterfactual that cannot be measured. Some investments have both economic and environmental benefits and might occur anyway. Uncertainty surrounds both emissions and investment returns. Parties to the project are likely to have more information than the certifying authority. The certifying agent is limited in its ability to design a contract that would reveal investment intentions. As a result, rules for baseline determination may be systematically biased to overallocate, and they also...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Clean Development Mechanism; Baseline emissions; Asymmetric information; Environmental Economics and Policy; D8; Q4.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10520
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Producer's choice of certification AgEcon
Langinier, Corinne; Babcock, Bruce A..
Consumers are in general less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce the information gap, consumers can rely on standards (labels, certifications, geographic indications) that insure quality and origin of the goods. However, these standards do not always fully reveal information. Some of them may just signal that the good is more likely to be of high quality. We investigate what kind of standards are most desirable for producers, and for society in general knowing that any system is costly to implement. One of our findings is that for intermediate values of certification costs, certification that fully reveals information makes high quality producers better off, but make the entire industry worse off. In this case, the...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Certification; Clubs; Quality.; Consumer/Household Economics; L11; L15; D82; D71.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19510
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Green payment programs, asymmetric information and the role of fixed costs AgEcon
Arguedas, C.; Meijerink, Gerdien W.; van Soest, Daan P..
Many conservation programs offer financial compensation to farmers in exchange for socially desired services, such as soil conservation or biodiversity protection. Realization of the conservation objective at minimum cost requires payments to just cover the extra costs incurred by each individual (type of) farmer. In the presence of information asymmetries regarding costs, incentive-compatible contracts can be designed to mitigate excess compensation, but these typically only provide partial improvement because of several distortions. We argue that these distortions are inevitable only if all conservation costs are variable in nature. If there are fixed costs too, we find that the least-cost solution can be incentive compatible. We identify the exact...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Environmental benefits; Mechanism design; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44320
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Taxes Versus Quantities for a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Costs and Asymmetric Information AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Zhang, Jiangfeng.
Non-strategic firms with rational expectations make investment and emissions decisions. The investment rule depends on firms’ beliefs about future emissions policies. We compare emissions taxes and quotas when the (strategic) regulator and (nonstrategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov Perfect decision rules. Emissions taxes create a secondary distortion at the investment stage, unless a particular condition holds; emissions quotas do not create a secondary distortion. We solve a linear-quadratic model calibrated to represent the problem of controlling greenhouse gasses. The endogeneity of abatement capital favors taxes, and it increases abatement.
Tipo: Thesis or Dissertation Palavras-chave: Pollution control; Investment; Asymmetric information; Rational expectations; Choice of instruments; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C61; D8; H21; Q28.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42877
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GREEN PAYMENTS AND DUAL POLICY GOALS AgEcon
Feng, Hongli.
Replaced with revised version of paper 07/27/07
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Cost effect; Green payments; Income support; Information rent; Mechanism design; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18550
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Individual and Collective Reputation: Lessons from the Wine Market AgEcon
Castriota, Stefano; Delmastro, Marco.
The concept of reputation has been used in every field of economic research, given its capacity to affect the outcome of all economic and financial transactions. The theoretical debate on reputation is very rich, but the mechanisms of reputation building have not been explored enough from the empirical viewpoint. In this paper we investigate the determinants of firm reputation taking into consideration the interactions between individual and collective reputation. This paper is one of the first attempts to provide robust evidence on the determinants of firm reputation using a large set of controls applied to a database not affected by self-selection bias. In fact, we constructed a new database containing the universe of wineries located in four regions of...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Reputation; Credibility; Asymmetric information; Quality standards; Industrial Organization; L14; L15.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/45504
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A Model of Producer Incentives for Livestock Disease Management AgEcon
Ranjan, Ram; Lubowski, Ruben N..
We examine the management of livestock diseases from the producers' perspective, incorporating information and incentive asymmetries between producers and regulators. Using a dynamic model, we examine responses to different policy options including indemnity payments, subsidies to report at-risk animals, monitoring, and regulatory approaches to decreasing infection risks when perverse incentives and multiple policies interact. This conceptual analysis illustrates the importance of designing efficient combinations of regulatory and incentive-based policies.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Livestock disease; Asymmetric information; Reporting; Indemnities; Risk management; Livestock Production/Industries; C61; D82; Q12; Q18; Q28.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15653
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Bargaining, Search, and Price Dispersion: Evidence from the Live Hogs Market AgEcon
Vukina, Tomislav; Zheng, Xiaoyong.
Using unique panel data on individual transactions between buyers and sellers in the spot market for live hogs, we found a large degree of intra-day price dispersion. Motivated by this empirical puzzle, we offer an explanation which is rooted in the bargaining with search theory. We formulate three hypotheses involving the role of farmers’ search cost, bargaining parties’ patience, and asymmetric information that we believe can explain the observed phenomenon. Empirical analysis shows strong support for all three of the stated theoretical predictions, indicating that the bargaining with search theory explains at least 31 percent of the observed intra-day price variation in this market.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Intra-day price dispersion; Bargaining theory; Search cost; Asymmetric information; Demand and Price Analysis.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95603
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Regulation of Stock Externalities with Correlated Costs AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Zhang, Jiangfeng.
We study a dynamic regulation model where firms' actions contribute to a stock externality. The regulator and firms have asymmetric information about serially correlated abatement costs. With price-based policies such as taxes, or if firms trade quotas efficiently, the regulator learns about the evolution of both stock and costs. This ability to learn about costs is important in determining the ranking of taxes and quotas, and in determining the value of a feedback rather than an open-loop policy.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Pollution control; Asymmetric information; Learning; Correlated costs; Choice of instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; D8; H21; Q28.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25077
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Project-Based Mechanisms for Emissions Reductions: Balancing Trade-offs with Baselines AgEcon
Fischer, Carolyn.
Project-based mechanisms for emissions reductions credits, like the Clean Development Mechanism, pose important challenges for policy design because of several inherent characteristics. Participation is voluntary, so it will not occur without sufficient credits. Evaluating reductions requires assigning an emissions baseline for a counterfactual that cannot be measured. Some investments have both economic and environmental benefits and might occur anyway. Uncertainty surrounds both emissions and investment returns, and parties to the project are likely to have more information than the certifying authority. The certifying agent is limited in its ability to design a contract that would reveal investment intentions. As a result, rules for benchmarking...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Clean Development Mechanism; Baselines; Asymmetric information; Offsets; Emissions reduction; Tradable emissions permits; Environmental Economics and Policy; D8; Q4.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10836
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On the optimal design of income support and agri-environmental regulation AgEcon
Bontems, Philippe.
In this paper, we develop a model of regulation for a set of heterogenous farmers whose production yields to environmental externalities. The goal of the regulator is first to offer some income support depending on collective preferences towards income redistribution and second to internalize externalities. The optimal policy is constrained by the information available. We first consider the second best where the regulator is able to observe all individuals decisions in terms of inputs and individual profit, but not the individual farming labor supply. We characterized the generalized transfer in function of the desire to redistribute and the underlying characteristics of the production process. In a second step, we assume that the regulator has only...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Agricultural policy; Agri-environmental policy; Income support; Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q18; Q12; Q58.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6246
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