SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Gallerani, Vittorio; Raggi, Meri; Viaggi, Davide.

Agri-Environmetal Policy (AEP) application raised a wide debate about the determination of payment levels and the efficiency of the economic instruments used. In particular, some aspects support the hypothesis of relevant rents due to an overcompensation of farmers� compliance costs. A policy tool suitable for improving the efficiency of AEP can be the adoption of auctions mechanisms in contract allocation. In theory, in an auction mechanism, the farmers have incentives to reveal their compliance costs, helping to reduce the information rents and increase cost-effectiveness. A crucial problem therefore arises from the uneven distribution of information between landowners and the public administration. Auctions mechanism can be useful in reducing...

Allocation of CO2 Emissions Allowances in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program

Palavras-chave: Auction; Agri-Environmental Policy; Information asymmetries.; Agricultural Finance; Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6660

Burtraw, Dallas; Palmer, Karen L.; Kahn, Danny.

Cap-and-trade programs for air emissions have become the widely accepted, preferred approach to cost-effective pollution reduction. One of the important design questions in a trading program is how to initially distribute the emissions allowances. Under the Acid Rain program created by Title IV of the Clean Air Act, most emissions allowances were distributed to current emitters on the basis of a historic measure of electricity generation in an approach known as grandfathering. Recent proposals have suggested two alternative approaches: allocation according to a formula that is updated over time according to some performance metric in a recent year (the share of electricity generation or something else) and auctioning allowances to the highest bidders....

IMPORT TENDERS AND BIDDING STRATEGIES IN WHEAT

Palavras-chave: Emissions trading; Allowance allocations; Electricity; Air pollution; Auction; Grandfathering; Generation performance standard; Output-based allocation; Cost-effectiveness; Greenhouse gases; Climate change; Global warming; Carbon dioxide; Sulfur dioxide; Nitrogen oxides; Mercury; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q2; Q25; Q4; L94.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10650

Wilson, William W.; Dahl, Bruce L..

Bidding competition plays an important role in price discovery and the determination of suppliers in international grains. In this paper we analyze international bidding competition for wheat for a specific importer. Tender data over the period 1993-1999 were analyzed and bid functions estimated by class of wheat (hard red spring, hard amber durum, and hard red winter denoted as HRS, HAD, and HRW, respectively) and by selling firm. A stochastic simulation model was developed to determine the optimal bid and to analyze factors affecting bidding behavior and competition. The tender data indicated there was a surprisingly wide range of bids. Variation of bids across firms submitted for individual HRS tenders had standard deviations that ranged from $5/mt...

ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF SOURCE VERIFICATION OF FEEDER CATTLE

Palavras-chave: Auction; Bidding; Wheat tenders; Optimal bid; U.S.; Canada; Marketing.

Ano: 2000

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23285

Lawrence, John D.; Yeboah, Godfred.

Source-verified (SV) feeder cattle auctions were held in Bloomfield, Iowa, each October, November, and December from 1997-2000. This study compares price data from these SV auctions to traditional auctions at the same location to determine whether a premium exists for SV feeder cattle. Hedonic pricing models were estimated to evaluate the price effects of lot characteristics, market forces, and type of market (SV versus regular sale). The SV cattle were sorted and pooled into large lots. The larger lot size, consistent with early research, earned large price premiums. After accounting for lot size, the SV premium for lighter cattle (< 650/600-pound steers/heifers) was estimated at $1.30/cwt, and was significant. The SV premium over and above lot size...

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Auction; Cattle; Hedonic pricing model; Markets; Source-verified auction; Livestock Production/Industries.

Ano: 2002

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14722

The Effect of Allowance Allocation on the Cost of Carbon Emission Trading

Burtraw, Dallas; Palmer, Karen L.; Bharvirkar, Ranjit; Paul, Anthony.

We investigate the cost-effectiveness and distributional effects of a revenue-raising auction, grandfathering, and a generation performance standard as alternative approaches for distributing carbon emission allowances in the electricity sector. We solve a detailed national electricity market model and find the auction is roughly one-half the societal cost of the other approaches. This result holds under a variety of assumptions about the future state of economic regulation and competition in the electricity sector. The differences in the cost of the approaches flow from the effect of each approach on electricity price. Grandfathering is the best for producers but it imposes a substantial cost on consumers. The generation performance standard yields the...

PARTICIPATION AND LEARNING IN AUCTIONS: BIDDING DECISIONS IN EGYPTIAN OILSEED AUCTIONS

Palavras-chave: Carbon; Emission allowance trading; Allowance allocations; Electricity; Restructuring; Air pollution; Safety valve; Auction; Grandfathering; Generation performance standard; Output-based allocation; Cost-effectiveness; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q2; Q25; Q4; L94.

Ano: 2001

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10536

Wilson, William W.; Wilson, Wesley W..

Auctions are common mechanisms for identifying prices and suppliers of commodities and are particularly important in agricultural marketing. Information asymmetries among bidders may be ameliorated over time through some form of learning. In this study, we incorporate prior decisions to participate, information from previous auctions, and firm-specific attributes to explain both the decision to bid and the level of the bid. Our analysis uses data from Egyptian oilseed tenders, an important market both for oilseeds and tendering. Because of the unbalanced nature of the panel data, we are able to evaluate the effects of signals received from previous tenders. We find that firms learn from previous auctions and can gain an informational advantage through...

TESTING FOR THE MONOTONE LIKELIHOOD RATIO ASSUMPTION

Palavras-chave: Auction; Bidding; Tenders; Optimal bids; Learning; Marketing.

Ano: 2002

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23647

Roosen, Jutta; Hennessy, David A..

Monotonicity of the likelihood ratio for conditioned densities is a common technical assumption in economic models. But we have found no empirical tests for its plausibility. This paper develops such a test based on the theory of order-restricted inference, which is robust with respect to the correlation structure of the distributions being compared. We apply the test to study the technology revealed by agricultural production experiments. For the data under scrutiny, the results support the assumption of the monotone likelihood ratio. In a second application, we find some support for the assumption of affiliation among bids cast in a multiple-round Vickrey auction for a consumption good.

Show Quality Quarter Horse Auctions: Price Determinants and Buy-Back Practices

Palavras-chave: Affiliation; Auction; Likelihood ratio; Order-restricted inference; Stochastic order; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18398

Taylor, Mykel R.; Dhuyvetter, Kevin C.; Kastens, Terry L.; Douthit, Megan; Marsh, Thomas L..

This study estimates the price determinants of show quality quarter horses sold at auction. Several characteristics including genetic and physical traits, quality of pedigree, and performance record of the horse, as well as the horse's offspring, were found to significantly impact selling price. Sale order positively affected price and appears to be driven by buyers rather than intentional ordering of the horses. A common practice at horse auctions is for the seller to reject the final bid offered and buy back the horse. Model-predicted prices for these buy-back horses indicate they are not undervalued by the final bids, based on their characteristics.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Auction; Equine; Hedonic pricing; Quarter horses; Demand and Price Analysis.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8631

EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION OF A THIN MARKET: PRICE BEHAVIOR IN A DECLINING TERMINAL MARKET REVISITED

Nelson, Robert G.; Turner, Steven C..

Perceived characteristics of thin markets are described and approaches to furthering their study are suggested. Design features of a laboratory thin market, patterned after a typical livestock marketing situation, are described. Price bias and variation from a "thick" private negotiation market with 22 traders is compared to that from a "thin" auction market with 8 traders. No systematic price bias was found in any of the markets. Price variation was actually lower in the thin auction market.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Auction; Experimental economics; Price discovery; Thin market; Marketing.

Ano: 1995

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15328

The Effects of Penalty Design on Market Performance: Experimental Evidence from an Emissions Trading Scheme with Auctioned Permits

Restiani, Phillia; Betz, Regina.

This paper investigates the behavioural implications of penalty designs on market performance using an experimental method. Three penalty types and two penalty levels are enforced in a laboratory permit market with auctioning, including the Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme proposed design of tying the penalty rate to the auction price. Compliance strategies are limited to undertaking irreversible abatement investment decisions or buying permits. We aim to assess how penalty design under the presence of subjects‟ risk preferences might affect compliance incentives, permit price discovery, and efficiency. In contrast to theory, we find that penalty levels serve as a focal point that indicates compliance costs and affects compliance strategies....

Tipo: Report

Palavras-chave: Emissions trading; Penalty design; Experiment; Auction; Irreversible investment; Abatement; Compliance; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/107586

International Flower Networks: Transparency and Risks in Marketing Channel Choice

Wijnands, Jo H.M.; van der Lans, Karin; Hobbs, Jill E..

Two thirds of Kenyan cut flowers are marketed through Dutch flower auctions, while the remainder is marketed directly to retailers. Auctions do not restrict the volumes marketed; however price determination is based on a spot market. A Transaction Cost approach is used to investigate the differences in marketing costs between the channels. The results suggest that there are no differences between the channels in terms of uncertainty about prices, finding buyers or transparency of quality standards. Auction growers pay a higher marketing fee but they have significantly fewer office employees and flower varieties compared to growers who market directly.

The Effect on Asset Values of the Allocation of Carbon Dioxide Emission Allowances

Palavras-chave: Transaction Costs; Auction; Flowers; Kenya; Netherlands; Agribusiness; International Relations/Trade.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7759

Burtraw, Dallas; Palmer, Karen L.; Bharvirkar, Ranjit; Paul, Anthony.

Paradoxically, owners of existing generation assets may be better off paying for carbon dioxide emission allowances than having them distributed for free. This analysis shows that it takes just 7.5% of the revenue raised under an auction to preserve the asset values of existing generators.

RESERVATION PRICE ANNOUNCEMENT IN SEALED BID AUCTIONS: COMMENT

Palavras-chave: Carbon dioxide; Emission allowance trading; Allocation; Electricity; Restructuring; Air pollution; Auction; Grandfathering; Generation performance standard; Outputbased allocation; Cost-effectiveness; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q2; Q25; Q4; L94.

Ano: 2002

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10705

Schroeter, John R..

This comment corrects some errors of analysis contained in a 1993 paper by Carey in the Journal of Industrial Economics.

Evaluating the potential contribution of contract auctions to Agri-Environmental Policy efficiency: A simulation model for Emilia-Romagna (Italy)

Palavras-chave: Auction; Reservation price; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18261

Viaggi, Davide; Raggi, Meri; Gallerani, Vittorio.

Auctions are a potentially suitable policy tool for increasing the efficiency of Agri- Environmental Schemes (AES) through an improved allocation of contracts. In theory, through the auction mechanism, farmers have incentives to reveal their compliance costs, helping to reduce information rents and increase policy cost-effectiveness. The aim of this paper is to simulate the potential contribution of auction mechanisms to the efficiency of AES in Emilia-Romagna (Italy). The results show advantages for auctions compared with traditional flat rate payments based on average compliance costs. However, their performance is worse than flat payments based on marginal compliance costs.

Tipo: Article

Palavras-chave: Auction; Contract; Agri-Environmental Policy; Information asymmetry; Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q15; Q18.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118671

FEEDLOT '99, PART I: BASELINE REFERENCE OF FEEDLOT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, 1999

PRICE DETERMINANTS OF SHOW QUALITY QUARTER HORSES

The National Animal Health Monitoring System (NAHMS) is sponsored by the USDA:APHIS: Veterinary Services (VS). The NAHMS Feedlot '99 Study included feedlots of 1000-head or greater capacity from the 12 leading cattle feeding states. Feedlots included in the study represented 84.9 percent of U.S. feedlots of this size and contained 96.1 percent of the U.S. feedlot cattle inventory on feedlots with 1000-head or greater capacity as of January 1, 2000. For the purposes of the study, operations were grouped into two size categories: those with capacities of between 1000 and 7999 head, and those with capacities of 8000 head or more. Beef animals were the main type of cattle placed in feedlots regardless of operation size. Approximately one-half of the placements...

Tipo: Report

Palavras-chave: NAHMS; Cattle; Cow; Calf; Beef cow-calf; Beef; Cow-calf; Feedlot; Steer; Heifer; Auction; Custom feeding; Feed; Lot; Management; Markets; Weaning; Disease; Region; Environment; Ionophore; Coccidiostat; Probiotic; Quality; Quality assurance; Nutrition; Livestock Production/Industries.

Ano: 2000

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/32768

Taylor, Mykel R.; Dhuyvetter, Kevin C.; Kastens, Terry L.; Douthit, Megan; Marsh, Thomas L..

This study estimates the price determinants of show quality Quarter Horses sold at auction. Several characteristics including genetic and physical traits, the quality of pedigree, and the sale order affect price. Sale price is positively affected by a strong performance record of the horse as well as the performance record of the horse's offspring. A common practice at horse auctions is for the seller to reject the final bid offered and not sell the horse. The market prices predicted by the model for these horses indicate that they are not undervalued by the final bids, based on their characteristics.

Auctioning Payment Entitlements

Palavras-chave: Auction; Censored regression; Hedonic model; Quarter Horses; Demand and Price Analysis; Livestock Production/Industries.

Ano: 2004

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/36199

Nielsen, Kurt.

Payment entitlements is a new commodity that arises from the new European common agricultural policy. The agricultural subsidies are decoupled from the actual production and replaced by the so-called payment entitlements. A payment entitlement has a farm specific value and may be freely traded. This paper discusses the complexity of this new market and suggests an auction that simplifies the complexity. The suggested auction allows a buyer to simultaneously bid on all payment entitlements. The prices are found by a tatonnement that monotonically approximates the equilibrium prices for the different types of payment entitlements for sale. The auction enhances the competition and efficiency of the market, which is essential for the individual members of the...

Implementing the Efficient Auction: Initial Results from the Lab

Palavras-chave: Auction; Multiple goods; Bidding agents; Tatonnement; Agricultural subsidies; Agricultural Finance; D44; Q13.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24566

Margolis, Michael; Shogren, Jason F..

The efficient auction is designed to induce truthful bidding for bidders with affiliated values. Herein we implement the auction in the lab, and observe that inexperienced people can bid systematically in this more complex environment, albeit yielding a flatter bid function than the truthful one.

An Experimental Analysis of Auctioning Emission Allowances Under a Loose Cap

Palavras-chave: Auction; Affiliation; Experiments; Valuation; Financial Economics; C9; D44.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10733

Willingness to pay for a local food label for lamb meat in Spain

Shobe, William; Palmer, Karen L.; Myers, Erica; Holt, Charles; Goeree, Jacob K.; Burtraw, Dallas.

The direct sale of emission allowances by auction is an emerging characteristic of cap-and-trade programs. This study is motivated by the observation that all of the major implementations of cap-and-trade regulations for the control of air pollution have started with a generous allocation of allowances relative to recent emissions history, a situation we refer to as a “loose cap.” Typically more stringent reductions are achieved in subsequent years of a program. We use an experimental setting to investigate the effects of a loose cap environment on a variety of auction types. We find that all auction formats studied are efficient in allocating emission allowances, but auction revenues tend to be lower relative to competitive benchmarks when the cap is...

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Auction; Carbon dioxide; Greenhouse gases; Allowance trading; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative; RGGI; Cap and trade; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90827

Gracia, Azucena; de Magistris, Tiziana; Nayga, Rodolfo M., Jr..

The aim of the paper is to assess consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for a local food produced in a less-favoured area in the Aragon region (Spain). In particular, we examine whether consumers value lamb meat products (lamb and suckling lamb) labelled as “Ojinegra from Teruel”, traditionally produced in these area. We use a nonhypothetical experimental auction to elicit Spanish consumers’ WTP for “Ojinegra from Teruel” labelled lamb products. Results show that consumers are willing to pay a positive premium for a lamb and suckling lamb labelled as “Ojinegra from Teruel”.