|
|
|
| Registros recuperados: 21 | |
|
|
| Cotterill, Ronald W.. |
| This article documents the need for reform of milk pricing in the Northeast. The New York price gouging law can be recast as a fair share law. This new milk policy "kills two birds with one stone." It corrects regional inequities in raw milk pricing by reforming the pricing of milk at retail by limiting and redistributing excessive retail margins to farmers and consumers. The fair share policy relieves allocative price inefficiency, improves the performance of the federal milk market order pool, and improves the general performance of the Northeast dairy farming and fluid milk industries. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Market power; Bargaining; Over-order premiums; Fair share pricing; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10211 |
| |
|
|
| Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo. |
| The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Non-Cooperative Game Theory; Simulation Models; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; C71; C78. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7446 |
| |
|
|
| Bhaduri, Anik; Perez, Nicostrato D.; Liebe, Jens. |
| The paper explores the scope and sustainability of a self-enforcing cooperative agreement in the framework of a game theoretic model, where the upstream and downstream country, Burkina Faso and Ghana respectively in the Volta River Basin, bargain over the level of water abstraction in the upstream. In the model we consider the case where the downstream country, Ghana, offers a discounted price for energy export to the upstream country, Burkina Faso, to restrict its water abstraction rate in the upstream. The paper examines the benefits and sustainability of such self-enforcing cooperative arrangements between Ghana and Burkina Faso given stochastic uncertainty in the river flow. The findings of the paper suggest that at the present condition, the marginal... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Cooperation; Transboundary; Uncertainty; Volta River Basin; Demand and Price Analysis; Environmental Economics and Policy; Risk and Uncertainty. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43324 |
| |
|
|
| Ranjan, Ram. |
| This Paper designs a political economy model of invasive species management in order to explore the effectiveness of tariffs in mitigating the risk of invasion. The revenue interests of the government together with the interests of the lobby group competing with the imported agricultural commodity, that is believed to be the vector of invasive species, are incorporated in a Nash Bargaining game. The government, however, also considers the impact of tariffs on long run risks of invasion and decides optimal tariffs based upon its welfare in the pre and post-invasion scenarios. Along with the size of the lobby group, which is a function of the slope of the demand and supply curves, the weights assigned to the various components in the government welfare... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Invasive species; Political economy; Tariffs; Bargaining; Interest groups; Political Economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; H23; Q17; Q58. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15642 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Querou, Nicolas. |
| We consider a situation where groups negotiate over the allocation of a surplus (which is used to fund group specific goods). Each group is composed of agents who have differing valuations for public goods. Members choose a representative to take decisions on their behalf. Specifically, representatives can decide to enter either a (cooperative) negotiation protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata allocation (as a function of the size of the groups). We analyse the conditions (on the internal composition of the groups) under which conflict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa), and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we provide results of comparative... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Conflict; Agency Problem; Environmental Economics and Policy; C78; D74; J52. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96841 |
| |
|
|
| Prasertsri, Peerapon; Kilmer, Richard L.. |
| As a result of economies of size, food processors are generally large and few in number. These characteristics put processors at a bargaining advantage over independent farmers. Marketing cooperatives were established to counter the uneven bargaining position of individual farmers. This article investigates the relative bargaining strength of one milk marketing cooperative and several fluid milk processors. The Nash bargaining model can be used to analyze the negotiated price in the Florida fluid milk market which acts like a bilateral monopoly. The milk marketing cooperatives have bargained well with the milk marketing processors. The monthly bargaining strength of the Southeast Dairy Cooperative, Inc. (SDC), exceeds the monthly bargaining strength of the... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Bargaining; Bilateral monopoly; Dairy; Processors; Agribusiness; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/45664 |
| |
|
|
| Furtan, William Hartley; Guzel, A.; Karantininis, Kostas. |
| The Doha Round has been slow to achieve a reduction in the level of agricultural protection. This remains the case notwithstanding the substantial economic benefits that would arise from a more liberal agricultural trading regime. We provide one explanation for this slowness using a simple bargaining model. We demonstrate that the bargaining countries received a substantial fiscal gain from reducing government expenditures in the run-up to the Uruguay Round. This fiscal pressure was sufficient to block rent seekers who wanted farm payments to continue. Since the Uruguay Round these fiscal constraints have been reduced and the same pressure to reach a bargain and control rent-seeking behaviour is not present in the Doha Round. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Doha Round; Rent seeking; Bargaining; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7706 |
| |
|
|
| Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo. |
| The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process asymmetries and uncertainties in particular by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of players optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations,... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Non-Cooperative Game Theory; Simulation Models; Uncertainty; Risk and Uncertainty; C61; C71; C78. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8224 |
| |
|
|
| Ehmke, Mariah D.; Morgan, Kari; Schroeter, Christiane; Larson-Meyer, Enette; Ballenger, Nicole. |
| This research uses experimental economics to measure the effect of parental generosity and child response on childhood overweight and obesity. The 'Carrot-Stick' experiment, an adaptation of the standard dictator game in which the respondent (the child) can punish or reward the dictator (the parent) based on the dictator's generosity, served as basis of our examination. Two treatments are conducted, in which the child spends his or her earnings on non-food and food items. Our empirical analysis shows significant relationships between parental weight and their level of generosity regarding food items. We conclude that child response behavior, obesigenic factors in the household, and the child's tendency toward being overweight and obese are significantly... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Overweight; Obesity; Childhood; Family; Bargaining; Carrot-Stick; Dictator; Experimental Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Health Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9859 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Adam, Christopher; Hoddinott, John; Ligon, Ethan. |
| This paper develops a dynamic model of household bargaining and uses it to motivate an empirical analysis of the impact changes in Canadian laws regarding the allocation of family assets upon divorce on female suicide. Using time series data, we show that in Ontario, the passage of Canadian legislation that improved women's rights to assets upon divorce was associated with reductions in the rate of female suicide amongst older (married) women while not affecting younger (unmarried) women. As suggested by our model, its impact was asymmetric in that male suicide rates were unaffected by this change. We also exploited a quasi-natural experiment in these data, namely that no comparable legislative change occurred in Quebec. Here, we do not observe a... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Intrahousehold; Bargaining; Divorce; Suicide; Canada; Community/Rural/Urban Development; D10; J12. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120422 |
| |
|
|
| Du, Xiaodong; Hennessy, David A.; Edwards, William M.. |
| Based on the Ricardian rent theory, this study employs the variable profit function to analyze the determinants of Iowa cropland cash rental rates using county-level panel data from 1987 to 2005. Accounting for spatial and temporal autocorrelations, responses of local cash rental rates to changes in output prices and other exogenous variables are estimated. We find that Iowa cash rental rates are largely determined by output/input prices, soil quality, relative location, and other county-specific factors. Cash rents go up by $79 for a $1 increase in corn price in the short run. The marginal value of cropland quality, as represented by row-crop corn suitability rating index, is about $1.05. Ethanol plants are not found to have a significant local effect on... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Basis; Ethanol; Land quality shadow price; Rate of adjustment; Spatial autocorrelation; Land Economics/Use. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7700 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Wolfe, Robert. |
| People at home and trade negotiators in Geneva cannot bargain what they do not understand, and what they bargain must be based on consensual understanding among the relevant actors, whether or not they agree on what to do about it. Consensual understanding is endogenous, arising in an argumentative process of learning structured by constitutive principles of a regime. In a departure from both rationalist and constructivist approaches to negotiation analysis in political science, my goal in this paper is to try to advance analysis of these questions by exploring the contribution that deliberation or arguing makes to learning. My proposition is that something happens at the multilateral negotiation table in addition to bargaining, something that alters... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: WTO; Bargaining; Learning; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Development; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90885 |
| |
|
| |
| Registros recuperados: 21 | |
|
|
|
