|
| Prasertsri, Peerapon; Kilmer, Richard L.. |
| As a result of economies of size, food processors are generally large and few in number. These characteristics put processors at a bargaining advantage over independent farmers. Marketing cooperatives were established to counter the uneven bargaining position of individual farmers. This article investigates the relative bargaining strength of one milk marketing cooperative and several fluid milk processors. The Nash bargaining model can be used to analyze the negotiated price in the Florida fluid milk market which acts like a bilateral monopoly. The milk marketing cooperatives have bargained well with the milk marketing processors. The monthly bargaining strength of the Southeast Dairy Cooperative, Inc. (SDC), exceeds the monthly bargaining strength of the... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Bargaining; Bilateral monopoly; Dairy; Processors; Agribusiness; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/45664 |
