SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Glebe, Thilo W.; Salhofer, Klaus.

Small countries may benefit from the formation of a trade bloc, since their combined market power will enable them to manipulate the terms of trade. The question of interest is whether countries will benefit from the enlargement of a trading bloc, if trade liberalization induces countries to substitute domestic support measures for conventional border protection. The paper deals with this question by analyzing the conditions for positive welfare effects resulting from the enlargement of a trade bloc. Based on a partial equilibrium trade model, we consider a game in production taxes/subsidies between two trade blocs. The tax/subsidy instrument may capture the production effect which can be induced by a combination of environmental, health or safety rules....

GALE-SHAPLEY MATCHING IN AN EVOLUTIONARY TRADE NETWORK GAME

Palavras-chave: Trade bloc; Trade liberalization; Game theory; European Union; International Relations/Trade; D6; F11; Q17; C7.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25529

Tesfatsion, Leigh.

For a postscript copy of this paper, click <a href="/Data/isu/er43.ps"> here. </A> This study investigates the performance of Gale-Shapley matching in an evolutionary market context. Computational experimental findings are reported for an evolutionary match-and-play trade network game in which resource-constrained traders repeatedly choose and refuse trade partners in accordance with Gale-Shapley matching, participate in risky trades modelled as two-person prisoner's dilemma games, and evolve their trade behavior over time. Particular attention is focused on correlations between ex ante market structure and the formation of trade networks, and between trade network formation and the types of trade behavior and social welfare outcomes that...

International Emission Strategies under the Threat of a Sudden Jump in Damages

Palavras-chave: Evolutionary game; Gale-Shapley matching; Iterated prisoners' dilemma; Trade networks; Endogenous interactions; Agent-based computational economics; International Relations/Trade; C7; C8; C9; D8; D4.

Ano: 1998

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18200

Nkuiya, Bruno.

We characterize the equilibrium level of emissions, the equilibrium stock of global pollution and the discounted net social welfare for both the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria when the countries face the threat of a sudden irreversible jump in the global damages at an unknown date. The goal is to analyze the impact of this type of uncertainty on the equilibrium behavior of the countries. We find that it can have a significant effect on those equilibria. Countries reduce their emissions to mitigate their exposure to this threat. As the level of threat rises, countries adjust their emissions to lower the stock of pollutant. However, although initially this threat has the effect of lowering the discounted net welfare, it can in the long run have a...

Profit Sharing under the Threat of Nationalization

Palavras-chave: Global pollution; Environmental uncertainty; Regime shift; Stochastic differential games; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; C7; D81; Q54.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/117826

Di Corato, Luca.

A government bargains a mutually convenient agreement with a multinational corporation to extract a natural resource. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a return a share on the profits. The host country provides access and guarantee conditions of operation. Being the investment totally sunk, the corporation must account in its plan not only for uncertainty on market conditions but also for the threat of nationalization. In a real options framework where the government holds an American call option on nationalization we show under which conditions a Nash bargaining is feasible and leads to attain a cooperative agreement maximizing the joint venture surplus. We find that the threat of nationalization does not affect the investment time...

Third Party Effects and Asymmetric Externalities in Groundwater Extraction: The Case of Cherokee Strip in Butte County, California

Palavras-chave: Real Options; Nash Bargaining; Expropriation; Natural Resources; Foreign Direct Investment; Financial Economics; C7; D8; K3; F2; O1.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59378

Msangi, Siwa; Howitt, Richard E..

While water markets have been shown to be beneficial to users, the transfers made through sales can have serious third-party impacts, as has been addressed in the water resources literature. Potential asymmetries arising from the hydrological characteristics of the groundwater basin could seriously affect the distribution of the impacts resulting from these transfers, when taken into account. In this paper we seek to extend the water resources management literature by examining the depletion problem experienced on the Cherokee Strip, in the hills of Butte County, and account for asymmetric external effects in a model of strategic groundwater pumping. The results of this model show that current ordinance restricting water transfers from Butte County does...

Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q25; C7; H23.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25436

Punish and Perish?

Antoci, Angelo; Zarri, Luca.

The evolution of large-scale cooperation among genetic strangers is a fundamental unanswered question in the social sciences. Behavioral economics has persuasively shown that so called ‘strong reciprocity’ plays a key role in accounting for the endogenous enforcement of cooperation. Insofar as strongly reciprocal players are willing to costly sanction defectors, cooperation flourishes. However, experimental evidence unambiguously indicates that not only defection and strong reciprocity, but also unconditional cooperation is a quantitatively important behavioral attitude. By referring to a prisoner’s dilemma framework where punishment (‘stick’) and rewarding (‘carrot’) options are available, here we show analytically that the presence of cooperators who...

Profit Sharing under the Threat of Nationalization

Palavras-chave: Cooperation; Strong Reciprocity; Altruistic Punishment; Altruistic Rewarding; Heterogeneous Types; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C7; D7; Z1.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/115847

Di Corato, Luca.

A multinational corporation engages in foreign direct investment for the extraction of a natural resource in a developing country. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a return a share of the profits. The host country provides access and guarantees conditions of operation. Since the investment is totally sunk, the corporation must account in its plan not only for uncertainty in market conditions but also for the threat of nationalization. In a real options framework, where the government holds an American call option on nationalization, we show under which conditions a Nash bargaining leads to a profit distribution maximizing the joint venture surplus. We find that the threat of nationalization does not affect the investment threshold...

Tenure Insecurity, Transaction Costs in the Land Lease Market and their Implications for Gendered Productivity Differentials

Palavras-chave: Real Options; Nash Bargaining; Expropriation; Natural Resources; Foreign Direct Investment; International Relations/Trade; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C7; D8; K3; F2; O1.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/58292

Holden, Stein T.; Bezabih, Mintewab.

This study sets out to assess the link between land leasing behavior and productivity differentials between male and female-headed households. A double-moral hazard model allows us to show that landlord's tenure insecurity leads to sub-optimal level of effort on tenant's part, via its impact on the likelihood of contract renewal. The landlord's enforcement ability is also shown to increase the optimal level of effort. The empirical findings support the hypothesis that female heads of households have higher tenant turnover and lower enforcement ability. The results, however, show that contract renewal is not strongly linked to productivity.

One Player Games versus Two Player Games: Comparing Agribusiness Cooperatives with Investor-Owned Business Models

Palavras-chave: Productivity; Female headed households; Contract length; Enforcement ability; Land Economics/Use; D2; Q12; Q15; C21; C7.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25273

Parker, Frederick.

Cooperative business firms are prevalent in agribusiness, yet no concise generalized model exists to demonstrate how and why cooperative firms differ from, and may be selected over, the more common investor owned business firm. It is shown within a generic transaction game that cooperatives fill both producer and consumer roles as an aggregated player that is expected to maximize aggregate producer and consumer payoffs rather than maximizing either payoff separately, which contrasts with investor owned firms as essentially two player games between separate and competing producers and consumers where each player seeks to maximize their separate payoff individually. A cardinally valued game theoretic matrix is used to demonstrate the expected differences...