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| Parker, Frederick. |
| Cooperative business firms are prevalent in agribusiness, yet no concise generalized model exists to demonstrate how and why cooperative firms differ from, and may be selected over, the more common investor owned business firm. It is shown within a generic transaction game that cooperatives fill both producer and consumer roles as an aggregated player that is expected to maximize aggregate producer and consumer payoffs rather than maximizing either payoff separately, which contrasts with investor owned firms as essentially two player games between separate and competing producers and consumers where each player seeks to maximize their separate payoff individually. A cardinally valued game theoretic matrix is used to demonstrate the expected differences... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cooperatives; Game Theory; Collective Action; Agricultural Economics; Theory of the Firm; Agribusiness; B5; C7; D7; L2; L3; Q1. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100691 |
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| Nkuiya, Bruno. |
| We characterize the equilibrium level of emissions, the equilibrium stock of global pollution and the discounted net social welfare for both the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria when the countries face the threat of a sudden irreversible jump in the global damages at an unknown date. The goal is to analyze the impact of this type of uncertainty on the equilibrium behavior of the countries. We find that it can have a significant effect on those equilibria. Countries reduce their emissions to mitigate their exposure to this threat. As the level of threat rises, countries adjust their emissions to lower the stock of pollutant. However, although initially this threat has the effect of lowering the discounted net welfare, it can in the long run have a... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Global pollution; Environmental uncertainty; Regime shift; Stochastic differential games; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; C7; D81; Q54. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/117826 |
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| Di Corato, Luca. |
| A government bargains a mutually convenient agreement with a multinational corporation to extract a natural resource. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a return a share on the profits. The host country provides access and guarantee conditions of operation. Being the investment totally sunk, the corporation must account in its plan not only for uncertainty on market conditions but also for the threat of nationalization. In a real options framework where the government holds an American call option on nationalization we show under which conditions a Nash bargaining is feasible and leads to attain a cooperative agreement maximizing the joint venture surplus. We find that the threat of nationalization does not affect the investment time... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Real Options; Nash Bargaining; Expropriation; Natural Resources; Foreign Direct Investment; Financial Economics; C7; D8; K3; F2; O1. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59378 |
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| Glebe, Thilo W.; Salhofer, Klaus. |
| Small countries may benefit from the formation of a trade bloc, since their combined market power will enable them to manipulate the terms of trade. The question of interest is whether countries will benefit from the enlargement of a trading bloc, if trade liberalization induces countries to substitute domestic support measures for conventional border protection. The paper deals with this question by analyzing the conditions for positive welfare effects resulting from the enlargement of a trade bloc. Based on a partial equilibrium trade model, we consider a game in production taxes/subsidies between two trade blocs. The tax/subsidy instrument may capture the production effect which can be induced by a combination of environmental, health or safety rules.... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Trade bloc; Trade liberalization; Game theory; European Union; International Relations/Trade; D6; F11; Q17; C7. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25529 |
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| Msangi, Siwa; Howitt, Richard E.. |
| While water markets have been shown to be beneficial to users, the transfers made through sales can have serious third-party impacts, as has been addressed in the water resources literature. Potential asymmetries arising from the hydrological characteristics of the groundwater basin could seriously affect the distribution of the impacts resulting from these transfers, when taken into account. In this paper we seek to extend the water resources management literature by examining the depletion problem experienced on the Cherokee Strip, in the hills of Butte County, and account for asymmetric external effects in a model of strategic groundwater pumping. The results of this model show that current ordinance restricting water transfers from Butte County does... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q25; C7; H23. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25436 |
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