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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (12) Autor Di Corato, Luca (2) Mauleon, Ana (2) Vannetelbosch, Vincent (2) Babus, Ana (1) Billand, Pascal (1) Bravard, Christophe (1) Caulier, Jean-Francois (1) Chakrabarti, Subhadip (1) Dimitrov, Dinko (1) Fosco, Constanza (1) Gardner, Justin G. (1) Grandjean, Gilles (1) Kushnir, Alexey (1) Mengel, Friederike (1) Naghavi, Alireza (1) Sarangi, Sudipta (1) Sung, Shao Chin (1) Tsai, Yingyi (1) Zikos, Vasileios (1) Mais... Palavra-chave C70 (12) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (4) Networks (3) A14 (2) D81 (2) D85 (2) Game Theory (2) Hyperbolic Discounting (2) L13 (2) L20 (2) Natural Resources Management (2) Network Formation (2) Q23 (2) Q58 (2) Real Options (2) Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (2) Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies (2) Time Inconsistency (2) A22 (1) Absorptive Capacity (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (8) Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Working Paper (2) Ano 2012 (1) 2011 (2) 2010 (1) 2009 (5) 2008 (2) 2007 (1) Mais... País United States (12) Idioma Inglês (12)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 12 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Matching Markets with Signals AgEcon Kushnir, Alexey. A costless signaling mechanism has been proposed as a device to improve welfare in decentralized two-sided matching markets. An example of such an environment is a job market for new Ph.D. economists. We study a market game of incomplete information between firms and workers and show that costless signaling is actually harmful in some matching markets. Specifically, if agents have very similar preferences, signaling lessens the total number of matches and the welfare of firms, as well as it affects ambiguously the welfare of workers. These results run contrary to previous findings that costless signaling facilitates match formation. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Matching Markets; Signaling; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C70. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50730 R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly AgEcon Zikos, Vasileios. We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing and efficient. This result is in contrast with earlier contributions in private oligopoly where under strong market rivalry a conflict between stable and efficient networks is likely to occur. A key finding of the paper is that state-owned enterprises may be used as policy instruments in tackling the potential conflict between individual and collective incentives for R&D collaboration. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Networks; R&D Collaboration; Mixed Oligopoly; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; C70; L13; L20; L31; L32; O31; D85. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6228 Cross-Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity AgEcon Naghavi, Alireza; Tsai, Yingyi. Current version uploaded April 2013. Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Intellectual Property Rights; TRIPS; Nash Bargaining; Contract Enforcement; Development; Absorptive Capacity; Monitoring; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; O34; F13; F53; D78; L10; O33; C70. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122864 Optimal Conservation Policy under Imperfect Intergenerational Altruism AgEcon Di Corato, Luca. In this paper we study the optimal forest conservation policy by a hyperbolically discounting society. Society comprises a series of non-overlapping imperfectly altruistic generations each represented by its own government. Under uncertainty about future pay-offs we determine, as solution of an intergenerational dynamic game, the optimal timing of irreversible harvest. Earlier harvest occurs and the option value attached to the forest clearing decision is eroded under both the assumptions of naïve and sophisticated belief about future time-preferences. This results in a bias toward the current generation gratification which affects the intergenerational allocation of benefits and costs from harvesting and conserving a natural forest. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Imperfect altruism; Real Options; Hyperbolic Discounting; Time Inconsistency; Natural Resources Management; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D81; C70; Q23; Q58. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114440 The Professor’s Dilemma: Teaching Game Theory in Principles of Agricultural Economics AgEcon Gardner, Justin G.. Working Paper Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Teaching; Game Theory; Agricultural Economics; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; A22; C70; Q19. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46569 Optimal Conservation Policy Under Imperfect Intergenerational Altruism AgEcon Di Corato, Luca. In this paper we study the optimal forest conservation policy by a hyperbolically discounting society. Society comprises a series of non-overlapping imperfectly altruistic generations each represented by its own government. Under uncertainty about future pay-offs we determine, as solution of an intergenerational dynamic game, the optimal timing of irreversible harvest. Earlier harvest occurs and the option value attached to the forest clearing decision is eroded under both the assumptions of naïve and sophisticated belief about future time-preferences. This results in a bias toward the current generation gratification which affects the intergenerational allocation of benefits and costs from harvesting and conserving a natural forest. Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Imperfect Altruism; Real Options; Hyperbolic Discounting; Time Inconsistency; Natural Resources Management; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D81; C70; Q23; Q58. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120022 Connections Among Farsighted Agents AgEcon Grandjean, Gilles; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch’s (Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming) notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set. We first investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks and the set of strongly efficient networks. We then provide some primitive conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly efficient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Farsighted Players; Stability; Efficiency; Connections Model; Buyerseller Networks; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A14; C70; D20. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50482 Contractually Stable Networks AgEcon Caulier, Jean-Francois; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Networks; Coalition Structures; Contractual Stability; Allocation Rules; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A14; C70. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52343 The Formation of Financial Networks AgEcon Babus, Ana. Modern banking systems are highly interconnected. Despite their various benefits, the linkages that exist between banks carry the risk of contagion. In this paper we investigate how banks decide on direct balance sheet linkages and the implications for contagion risk. In particular, we model a network formation process in the banking system. Banks form links order to reduce the risk of contagion. The network is formed endogenously and serves as an insurance mechanism. We show that banks manage to form networks that are resilient to contagion. Thus, in an equilibrium network, the probability of contagion is virtually 0. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Financial Stability; Network Formation; Contagion Risk; Financial Economics; C70; G21. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9100 Spying in Multi-market Oligopolies AgEcon Billand, Pascal; Bravard, Christophe; Chakrabarti, Subhadip; Sarangi, Sudipta. We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that maximize social welfare under the most interesting scenario of diseconomies of scope. We find that in some situations firms may refrain from spying even if it is costless. Moreover, even though spying leads to increased product quality, there exist situations where it is detrimental to both consumer welfare and social welfare. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Oligopoly; Multimarket; Networks; Environmental Economics and Policy; C70; L13; L20. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96632 Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games AgEcon Sung, Shao Chin; Dimitrov, Dinko. We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. Furthermore, the corresponding decision problems with respect to the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Additive Preferences; Coalition Formation; Computational Complexity; Hedonic Games; NP-hard; NP-complete; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C63; C70; C71; D02; D70; D71. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46655 Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks AgEcon Fosco, Constanza; Mengel, Friederike. We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in Prisoners’ Dilemma games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-based imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields polymorphic outcomes under a wide range of parameters. Depending on the parameters of the model two scenarios can arise. Either there is “full separation” of defectors and cooperators, i.e. they are found in two different, disconnected components. Or there is “marginalization” of defectors, i.e. connected networks emerge with a center of cooperators and a periphery of defectors. Simulations confirm our analytical results and show that the share of cooperators increases with the... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Cooperation; Imitation Learning; Network Formation; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C70; C73; D85. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50723 Registros recuperados: 12 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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