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| Registros recuperados: 31 | |
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| Ansink, Erik. |
| Many water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inherently unstable. Due to stochastic river flow, agreements may be broken in case of drought. The objective of this paper is to analyse whether water allocation agreements can be self-enforcing. An agreement is modelled as the outcome of bargaining game on river water allocation. Given this agreement, the bargaining game is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in which countries decide whether or not to comply with the agreement. I assess under what conditions such agreements are self-enforcing, given stochastic river flow. The results show that, for sufficiently low discounting, every efficient agreement can be sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium. Requiring... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Self-Enforcing Agreement; Repeated Extensive-Form Game; Water Allocation; Renegotiation-Proofness; Environmental Economics and Policy; C73; Q25. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54292 |
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| Zissimos, Ben. |
| This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries, a familiar problem of coordination failure arises giving rise to multiple equilibria; any one of many possible trade agreements can form. With distance between countries, and through strategic interaction in tariff setting, regional trade agreements generate larger rent-shifting effects than non regional agreements, which countries use to coordinate on a unique equilibrium. Under naive best responses, regional agreements give way to free trade. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Coalition; Coordination; Trade Liberalization; Trade Agreement; Regionalism; International Relations/Trade; F02; F13; F15; C73. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9102 |
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| Merlo, Antonio. |
| In this paper we structurally estimate a game-theoretic model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy. We focus on the timing and the terms of government agreements in the context of a multilateral stochastic model of sequential bargaining with complete information (Merlo and Wilson (1194, 1995)) where efficient delays may occur in the unique equilibrium. Besides showing that our model yields a good fit to the data on the duration of negotiations over government formation as well as government durations in postwar Italy, we use our estimates to quantify the advantage to proposing and to conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. We show that the gains from proposing tend to be quite... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Noncooperative bargaining; Delay; Government formation; Structural estimation; Duration models.; Political Economy; C41; C51; C73; C78; D72. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7476 |
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| Petrick, Martin. |
| The article contributes to the understanding of neo-endogenous rural development policies from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Rural development is modelled as the increasing realisation over time of gains from interaction by rural stakeholders. The model exhibits two dynamically stable equilibria, which depict declining and prospering regions. Neo-endogenous policies are interpreted as stimuli emerging from an external government authority which help decentralised actors to coordinate on the superior of the two equilibria. External intervention may thus be possible and desirable without giving up the autonomy of local decision makers. However, because initial conditions matter, outcomes cannot be planned or engineered from the outside. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Rural governance; Neo-endogenous policies; Evolutionary game theory; Collective action.; Community/Rural/Urban Development; C73; R23; R58. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114764 |
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| Kinateder, Markus. |
| Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project’s quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the corresponding project leader observes its realization. Any decision is only observed by the involved agents. The set of pure strategy Sequential Equilibria is characterized by giving an algorithm that selects one equilibrium at a time. An agent’s expected payoff is related to his position in the network, though no centrality measure in the literature captures this relation. A social planner frequently would achieve a higher welfare. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Dynamic Competitive Group Formation; Imperfect Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C73; D85. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50722 |
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| Eiswerth, Mark E.; van Kooten, G. Cornelis; Lines, Jeff M.; Eagle, Alison J.. |
| Nonnative invasive species result in sizeable economic damages and expensive control costs. Because dynamic optimization models break down if controls depend in complex ways on past controls, non-uniform or scale-dependent spatial attributes, etc., decision support systems that allow learning may be preferred. We compare three models of an invasive weed in California’s grazing lands: (1) a stochastic dynamic programming model, (2) a reinforcement-based, experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning model, and (3) an EWA model that also includes stochastic forage growth and penalties for repeated application of environmentally harmful control techniques. Results indicate that EWA learning models may be appropriate for invasive species management. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Invasive weed species; Optimal control; Adaptive management; Environmental Economics and Policy; C73; Q57. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37015 |
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| Albano, Gian Luigi; Cesi, Berardino. |
| When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, buyers may use different strategies depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, verifiable by contracting parties and by courts. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with different efficiency levels. If the contractor does not deliver the agreed level of performance the buyer may handicap the same firm in future competitive... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Repeated Procurement; Handicapping; Relational Contracts; Stick and Carrot Strategy; Political Economy; C73; D82; D44; H57; K12; L14. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6370 |
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| Registros recuperados: 31 | |
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