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| Registros recuperados: 21 | |
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| Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, Marc. |
| Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The players(s) who are the first to be acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition. The effects of different preference assumptions—particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness—and of player weights on the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated. The... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Coalition; Fallback Process; Kingmaker Leader; Cardinally Single-peaked; Ordinally Single-peaked; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C71; C78; D72. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52337 |
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| Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo. |
| The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Non-Cooperative Game Theory; Simulation Models; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; C71; C78. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7446 |
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| Oddou, Remy. |
| This paper analyzes the effect of spillovers and congestion of local public goods on the segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdiction. Households living in the same place form a jurisdiction and produce a local public good, that creates positive spillovers in other jurisdictions and suffers from congestion. In every jurisdiction, the production of the local public good is financed through a local tax on household's wealth. Local wealth tax rates are democratically determined in all jurisdictions. Households also consume housing in their jurisdiction. Any household is free to leave its jurisdiction for another one that would increase its utility. A necessary and sufficient condition to have every stable jurisdiction structure segregated by... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Jurisdictions; Segregation; Spillovers; Congestion; Environmental Economics and Policy; C78; D02; H73; R13. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108259 |
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| Querou, Nicolas. |
| We consider a situation where groups negotiate over the allocation of a surplus (which is used to fund group specific goods). Each group is composed of agents who have differing valuations for public goods. Members choose a representative to take decisions on their behalf. Specifically, representatives can decide to enter either a (cooperative) negotiation protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata allocation (as a function of the size of the groups). We analyse the conditions (on the internal composition of the groups) under which conflict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa), and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we provide results of comparative... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Conflict; Agency Problem; Environmental Economics and Policy; C78; D74; J52. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96841 |
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| Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo. |
| The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process asymmetries and uncertainties in particular by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of players optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations,... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Non-Cooperative Game Theory; Simulation Models; Uncertainty; Risk and Uncertainty; C61; C71; C78. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8224 |
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| Nicolo, Antonio; Rodriguez Alvarez, Carmelo. |
| We propose a model of Kidney-Exchange that incorporates the main European institutional features. We assume that patients do not consider all compatible kidneys homogeneous and patients are endowed with reservation values over the minimal quality of the kidney they may receive. Under feasibility constraints, patients' truthful revelation of reservation values is incompatible with constrained efficiency. In the light of this result, we introduce an alternative behavioral assumption on patients' incentives. Patients choose their revelation strategies as to “protect” themselves from bad outcomes and use a lexicographic refinement of maximin strategies. In this environment, if exchanges are pairwise, then priority rules or rules that maximize a fixed ordering... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Kidney; Matching; Protective Behavior; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C78; D78. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50671 |
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| Revilla, Pablo. |
| This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agents preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched to the same institution. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on agents preferences, we show that two possible situations in which, at least, one stable allocation exists, emerge. The first condition, called Group Togetherness, reflects real-life situations in which agents are more concerned about an acceptable set of colleagues than about the firm hiring them. The second one, Common Best Colleague, refers to markets in which a workers ranking is accepted by workers and firms present... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Many-to-one matching; Hedonic; Coalitions; Stability; Colleagues; Marketing; C78; D71. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7443 |
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| Merlo, Antonio. |
| In this paper we structurally estimate a game-theoretic model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy. We focus on the timing and the terms of government agreements in the context of a multilateral stochastic model of sequential bargaining with complete information (Merlo and Wilson (1194, 1995)) where efficient delays may occur in the unique equilibrium. Besides showing that our model yields a good fit to the data on the duration of negotiations over government formation as well as government durations in postwar Italy, we use our estimates to quantify the advantage to proposing and to conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. We show that the gains from proposing tend to be quite... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Noncooperative bargaining; Delay; Government formation; Structural estimation; Duration models.; Political Economy; C41; C51; C73; C78; D72. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7476 |
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| Dowell, Andrew J.; Wooldridge, Michael; McBurney, Peter. |
| Qualitative coalitional games (QCG) are representations of coalitional games in which self interested agents, each with their own individual goals, group together in order to achieve a set of goals which satisfy all the agents within that group. In such a representation, it is the strategy of the agents to find the best coalition to join. Previous work into QCGs has investigated the computational complexity of determining which is the best coalition to join. We plan to expand on this work by investigating the computational complexity of computing agent power in QCGs as well as by showing that insincere strategies, particularly bribery, are possible when the envy-freeness assumption is removed but that it is computationally difficult to identify the best... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Bribery; Coalition Formation; Computational Complexity; Marketing; C63; C78. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7444 |
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| Dimitrov, Dinko; Lazarova, Emiliya A.. |
| A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in and over the student groups he would like to teach to. Correspondingly, each student has preferences over the groups of students he wants to study with and over the teams of researchers he would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides, the restriction of agents’ preferences over groups to strict orderings, and the extent to which individual preferences respect common rankings shape the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Coalitions; Common Rankings; Core; Stability; Totally Balanced Games; Two-Sided Matchings; C78; J41; D71. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37523 |
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| Polanski, Arnold; Lazarova, Emiliya A.. |
| We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players’ payoffs result from coalitional bargaining. In this setting, we establish payoff uniqueness of the stationary equilibria when players exhibit some degree of impatience. We focus on market games with different player types, and derive under mild conditions an explicit formula for each type’s equilibrium payoff as market frictions vanish. The limit payoff of a type depends in an intuitive way on the supply and the demand for this type in the market, adjusted by the type-specific bargaining power. Our framework may be viewed as an alternative to the Walrasian price-setting mechanism. When we apply this methodology to the analysis of labor markets, we can determine endogenously the equilibrium firm size... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Multilateral Bargaining; Dynamic Markets; Labor Markets; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; C78; J30; L20. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108255 |
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| Kushnir, Alexey. |
| Some labor markets have recently developed formal signalling mechanisms, e.g. the signalling for interviews in the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Workers have almost aligned preferences over firms: each worker has “typical” commonly known preferences with probability close to one and “atypical” idiosyncratic preferences with the complementary probability close to zero. Firms have some commonly known preferences over workers. We show that the introduction of a signalling mechanism is harmful for this environment. Though signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also facilitate information... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Signaling; Cheaptalk; Matching; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; C78; D80; J44. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96837 |
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| Registros recuperados: 21 | |
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