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Enjolras, Geoffroy; Kast, Robert. |
High losses generated by natural catastrophes reduce the availability of insurance. Among the ways to manage risk, the subscriptions of participating and non-participating contracts respectively permit to implement the two major principles in risk allocation: the mutuality and the transfer principles. Decomposing a global risk into its idiosyncratic and systemic components, we show that: the participating contract hedges the individual losses under a variable premium and the systemic risk is covered with a non-participating contract under a fixed premium. Based on Doherty and Schlesinger (2002) and Mahul (2002) approaches, our model replaces the non-participating contract by a financial one based on an index closely correlated to the systemic risk, under a... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Catastrophe risk; Crop insurance; Optimal hedging; Securitization; Crop Production/Industries; Risk and Uncertainty. |
Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9268 |
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Enjolras, Geoffroy; Sentis, P.. |
Using data for 2002-2005 on a representative survey of French farms (FADN-RICA), we investigate the different factors that lead farmers to insure against crop risk. Our analysis takes into account a mix of both standard individual, financial and agricultural criteria. Cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses as well as logistic regressions underline the main differences between insured and non-insured farms. Compared to non-insured farms, we find that insured farms present greater financial and agricultural sizes, a more diversified production and have been motivated by the occurrence of recent catastrophic climatic events. Although essential in the cross-sectional analysis, the influence of financial parameters in the decision to insure is mitigated. On... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Insurance; Demand; Crop insurance; Catastrophe risk; Risk and Uncertainty. |
Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44395 |
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