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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Ilkilic, Rahmi (1) Ylkilic, Rahmi (1) Palavra-chave C62 (2) C72 (2) Centrality Measures (2) D85 (2) Nash Equilibrium (2) Networks (2) Cournot Markets (1) Efficiency (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) L11 (1) Q20 (1) Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (1) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (1) Tragedy of the Commons (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2009 (1) 2008 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Network of Commons AgEcon Ylkilic, Rahmi. A tragedy of the commons appears when the users of a common resource have incentives to exploit it more than the socially efficient level. We analyze the situation when the tragedy of the commons is embedded in a network of users and sources. Users play a game of extractions, where they decide how much resource to draw from each source they are connected to. We show that if the value of the resource to the users is linear, then each resource exhibits an isolated problem. There exists a unique equilibrium. But when the users have concave values, the network structure matters. The exploitation at each source depends on the centrality of the links connecting the source to the users. The equilibrium is unique and we provide a formula which expresses the... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Tragedy of the Commons; Networks; Nash Equilibrium; Efficiency; Centrality Measures; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C62; C72; D85; Q20. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6221 Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms AgEcon Ilkilic, Rahmi. Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Cournot Markets; Networks; Nash Equilibrium; Centrality Measures; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C62; C72; D85; L11. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50679 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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