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| Langinier, Corinne; Babcock, Bruce A.. |
| Consumers are in general less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce the information gap, consumers can rely on standards (labels, certifications, geographic indications) that insure quality and origin of the goods. However, these standards do not always fully reveal information. Some of them may just signal that the good is more likely to be of high quality. We investigate what kind of standards are most desirable for producers, and for society in general knowing that any system is costly to implement. One of our findings is that for intermediate values of certification costs, certification that fully reveals information makes high quality producers better off, but make the entire industry worse off. In this case, the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Certification; Clubs; Quality.; Consumer/Household Economics; L11; L15; D82; D71. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19510 |
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| Langinier, Corinne; Babcock, Bruce A.. |
| Consumers are in general less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce he information gap, consumers can rely on standards (e.g., certification) that ensure quality and origin of the goods. These costly standards can be adopted by a group of producers of high-quality goods. We study the formation of such a group that we model as a club. We first investigate under what circumstances a club of a given size is desirable for producers, and for society. We then analyze the optimal size of the club when there exists a direct barrier to entry, and when there is no barrier. We find that for intermediate values of certification costs, the industry and a club of a given size of certified producers have divergent incentives.... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Certification; Clubs; Quality; Institutional and Behavioral Economics. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18606 |
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