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| Forges, Francoise; Orzach, Ram. |
| In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Bayesian Game; Collusion; Core; Partition Form Game; Characteristic Function; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D44. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96668 |
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| Ma, Tay-Cheng. |
| The Taiwanese flour industry’s capacity utilization rate has maintained an extremely low level of 40% for more than 20 years. This article sets up a two-stage game model and uses the strategic effect of the firm’s capital investment on its rivals’ outputs to explain the nature of this excess capacity. The model is tested with panel data from the Taiwanese flour industry by using non-linear three-stage least squares. The evidences indicate that a large capacity built in the past could have been used strategically to reduce other firms’ outputs, in the context of a concerted action among the incumbent firms. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Strategic investment; Two-stage game; Collusion; Conjectural variation; L13. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37516 |
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| Rejesus, Roderick M.; Little, Bertis B.; Lovell, Ashley C.; Cross, Mike H.; Shucking, Michael. |
| This article analyzes anomalous patterns of agent, adjuster, and producer claim outcomes and determines the most likely pattern of collusion that is suggestive of fraud, waste, and abuse in the federal crop insurance program. Log-linear analysis of Poisson-distributed counts of anomalous entities is used to examine potential patterns of collusion. The most likely pattern of collusion present in the crop insurance program is where agents, adjusters, and producers nonrecursively interact with each other to coordinate their behavior. However, if a priori an intermediary is known to initiate and coordinate the collusion, a pattern where the producer acts as the intermediary is the most likely pattern of collusion evidenced in the data. These results have... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Abuse; Collusion; Crop insurance; Empirical analysis; Fraud; Waste; G22; Q12; Q18; Q19. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43393 |
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| Fabiosa, Jacinto F.. |
| Imports are increasingly becoming a significant source of Japan's pork supply. Japan's share of imports to total consumption increased from 9 percent in 1980 to 24 percent in 1990, reaching a maximum of 44 percent in 1996. Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) safeguard provisions for pork, Japan can raise its gate price by 24 percent when imports in a given quarter are 119 percent higher than the average imports of the last three years of the same quarter. Japan has already invoked the safeguard provision twice since the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) was signed in 1995. In both cases, the level and volatility of retail prices increased; the CIF values of imports increased, making the impact on the government of Japan (GOJ) tax revenue... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Collusion; International agricultural trade; Policy analysis; Welfare; International Relations/Trade; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18491 |
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