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| Registros recuperados: 41 | |
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| Hamm, Joseph A.; University of Nebraska Public Policy Center; Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; jhamm@unl.edu; PytlikZillig, Lisa M.; University of Nebraska Public Policy Center; lpytlikzillig2@unl.edu; Herian, Mitchel N.; University of Nebraska Public Policy Center; mnherian@nebraska.edu; Tomkins, Alan J.; University of Nebraska Public Policy Center; atomkins@unl.edu; Dietrich, Hannah; Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; Center on Children, Families, and the Law, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; hdietrich@ccfl.unl.edu; Michaels, Sarah; Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; University of Nebraska Public Policy Center ; michaels2@unl.edu. |
| Regulating water resources is a critically important yet increasingly complex component of the interaction between ecology and society. Many argue that effective water regulation relies heavily upon the compliance of water users. The relevant literature suggests that, rather than relying on external motivators for individual compliance, e.g., punishments and rewards, it is preferable to focus on internal motivators, including trust in others. Although prior scholarship has resulted in contemporary institutional efforts to increase public trust, these efforts are hindered by a lack of evidence regarding the specific situations in which trust, in its various forms, most effectively increases compliance. We report the results of an experiment designed to... |
| Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Reports |
Palavras-chave: Compliance; Human dimensions of natural resource management; Procedural justice; Trust; Water allocation. |
| Ano: 2013 |
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| Andrade, Gustavo S. M.; The University of Queensland, School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Management, Brisbane, QLD 4072, Australia; gsalgado.andrade@gmail.com; Rhodes, Jonathan R; The University of Queensland, School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Management, Brisbane, QLD 4072, Australia; j.rhodes@uq.edu.au. |
| Many protected areas (PAs) have followed the conventional and exclusionary approach applied at Yellowstone in 1872. As such, many parks have failed to fully integrate other important factors, such as social, cultural, and political issues. In some cases, this has triggered adverse social impacts on local communities, disrupting their traditional ways of living and limiting their control of and access to natural resources. Such an outcome can undermine protection policies through conflicts between park managers and local communities. The success of conservation strategies through protected areas may lie in the ability of managers to reconcile biodiversity conservation goals with social and economic issues and to promote greater compliance of local... |
| Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Reports |
Palavras-chave: Community-based natural resource management; Compliance; Conservation; Empowerment; Participation; Protected area management; Stewardship. |
| Ano: 2012 |
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| Arias, Adrian; Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies, James Cook University; School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, James Cook University; adrian.arias@my.jcu.edu.au; Sutton, Stephen G.; School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, James Cook University; Centre for Sustainable Tropical Fisheries and Aquaculture, James Cook University ; stephen.sutton@jcu.edu.au. |
| Understanding fishers’ compliance is essential for the successful management of marine protected areas. We used the random response technique (RRT) to assess recreational fishers’ compliance with no-take zones in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (GBRMP). The RRT allowed the asking of a sensitive question, i.e., “Did you, knowingly, fish within in a Green Zone during the last 12 months?” while protecting respondents’ confidentiality. Application of the RRT through a survey of recreational fishers indicated that the majority of recreational fishers, 90%, comply with no-take zones. Likewise, most fishers, 92%, reported not personally knowing anyone who had intentionally fished in a no-take zone, indicating... |
| Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Insight |
Palavras-chave: Compliance; False consensus effect; Great Barrier Reef; Illegal fishing; Marine protected area; Marine reserve; No-take zones; Poaching; Random response technique (RRT); Recreational fishing. |
| Ano: 2013 |
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| Pinheiro,Bruna; Zambrano,Marina B.; Vanz,Ana Paula; Brizola,Evelise; Souza,Liliane Todeschini de; Félix,Têmis Maria. |
| Abstract Treatment of moderate and severe forms of osteogenesis imperfecta (OI) with cyclic pamidronate at the Reference Center for OI Treatment in Southern Brazil was studied. A retrospective cohort study was conducted from 2002 to 2012. Data were obtained during inpatient (drug infusion) and outpatient care. Clinical data, including the presence of blue sclerae, dentinogenesis imperfecta, history and site of the fractures, biochemical data, including calcium, phosphorus, and alkaline phosphatase levels, were systematically collected. Bone mineral density (BMD) was measured using dual energy X-ray absorptiometry (DXA). Forty-five patients (26 females) were included in the study, and the age of the patients at the time of diagnosis ranged from 1 to 144... |
| Tipo: Info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
Palavras-chave: Osteogenesis imperfecta; Bone fracture; Clinical features; Pamidronate treatment; Compliance. |
| Ano: 2019 |
URL: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1415-47572019000200252 |
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| CARELLI, M.; MACHADO, D. A.. |
| Introdução; Objetivos deste documento; A necessidade da organização do conhecimento como resultado e como processo; O apoio à gestão da informação e do conhecimento na Embrapa Gado de Leite: histórico; O Sistema de registros e acompanhamento da produção da Embrapa Gado de Leite: Sistema Metas©; Qualificação comprobatória de produções; Como o Sistema Metas© corrobora a Compliance na Embrapa Gado de Leite; Registro de produções no Sistema Metas©; Registro de artigos em periódicos indexados; Registro de artigos (publicados em anais); Registro de capítulo em livro técnico/científico; Registro de teses e dissertações; Registro de notas técnicas (short communication); Registro de resumos em anais de congresso Registro de artigos de divulgação na mídia; Registro... |
| Tipo: Documentos (INFOTECA-E) |
Palavras-chave: Metas; Apoio a Gestão da informação; Produções Embrapa; Compliance. |
| Ano: 2019 |
URL: http://www.infoteca.cnptia.embrapa.br/infoteca/handle/doc/1120164 |
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| Rochet, Marie-joelle; Catchpole, Tom; Cadrin, Steve. |
| Discarding is considered by many as an important problem in world fisheries. In many regions, data collection onboard commercial vessels has intensified, and the understanding of both human and ecological drivers of discards is improving quickly. Discarding patterns vary widely across regions, fisheries, gears, and species. Fishers' responses to regulations and markets explain these complex patterns, on top of resource availability partly driven by environmental fluctuations. This expanded knowledge base provides an appropriate basis for discussing the discard mitigation measures proposed in various settings. In September 2012, a theme session was convened at the ICES Annual Science Conference in Bergen, Norway, to discuss these issues. This themed set of... |
| Tipo: Text |
Palavras-chave: Bycatch and discards; Catch quotas; Compliance; Landing obligation; Landing quotas; Market incentives; Minimum landing sizes; Onboard observer programmes; Selectivity. |
| Ano: 2014 |
URL: http://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00202/31353/29911.pdf |
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| Goetze, Jordan S.; Januchowski-hartley, Fraser A.; Claudet, Joachim; Langlois, Tim J.; Wilson, Shaun K.; Jupiter, Stacy D.. |
| Identifying the most sensitive indicators to changes in fishing pressure is important for accurately detecting impacts. Biomass is thought to be more sensitive than abundance and length, while the wariness of fishes is emerging as a new metric. Periodically harvested closures (PHCs) that involve the opening and closing of an area to fishing are the most common form of fisheries management in the western Pacific. The opening of PHCs to fishing provides a unique opportunity to compare the sensitivity of metrics, such as abundance, length, biomass and wariness, to changes in fishing pressure. Diver-operated stereo video (stereo-DOV) provides data on fish behavior (using a proxy for wariness, minimum approach distance) simultaneous to abundance and length... |
| Tipo: Text |
Palavras-chave: Artisanal fisheries; Catch efficiency; Compliance; Conservation; Customary management; Fish behavior; Fisheries management; Flight initiation distance. |
| Ano: 2017 |
URL: https://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00610/72247/71050.pdf |
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| Kim, Lois G.; White, Ian R.. |
| Survival data are most frequently analyzed by the intention-to-treat principle. However, presenting a compliance-adjusted analysis alongside the primary analysis can provide an insight into the effect of the treatment for those individuals actually complying with their randomized intervention. There are a number of methods for this type of analysis. Loeys and Goetghebeur (2003) use proportional hazards techniques to provide an estimate of the treatment effect for compliers when compliance is measured on an all-or-nothing scale. This methodology is here made available through a new Stata command, stcomply. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Stcomply; Compliance; Proportional hazards; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116246 |
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| Restiani, Phillia; Betz, Regina. |
| This paper employs a theoretical model to examine compliance incentives and market efficiency under three penalty types: the fixed penalty rate, which uses a constant marginal financial penalty; the make-good provision (quantity penalty), where each missing permit in the current period is to be offset with a ratio (restoration rate) in the following period; and a mixed penalty, which combines the two penalty types. Using a simple two-period model of firm's profit maximisation, we analyse compliance decisions and the efficient penalty level under each penalty type. Firms‟ compliance strategies are modelled as an irreversible investment in abatement measures and permit buying in the market. Our findings indicate that the penalty type does not affect... |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Emissions trading; Penalty design; Compliance; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/107585 |
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| Stranlund, John K.. |
| Most of the theoretical literature on enforcing environmental policies focuses on situations in which pollution sources are noncompliant. However, some recent work suggests that these situations will very often involve suboptimal policy designs. Thus, the circumstances under which it is efficient to implement policies that do not motivate full compliance appear to be more limited than most of the literature would imply. In this paper, I identify several circumstances under which regulators may conserve enforcement costs by implementing emissions taxes that firms evade. I demonstrate that a regulator can use a firm’s tax evasion to reduce monitoring effort, but only if its monitoring strategy can be made an increasing function of the firm’s emissions, if... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions Taxes; Monitoring; Sanctions; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; L51; Q58. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93967 |
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| Stranlund, John K.; Chavez, Carlos A.; Villena, Mauricio G.. |
| We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm. This holds whether or not regulators have complete information about firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring them for compliance, or the costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Moreover, ignoring several unrealistic special cases, optimality requires discriminatory emissions taxes except when regulators are unable to observe firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring individual firms, or any firm-specific characteristic that is known to be jointly distributed... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions Taxes; Monitoring; Asymmetric Information; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7387 |
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| Registros recuperados: 41 | |
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