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| Registros recuperados: 47 | |
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| Nadolnyak, Denis A.; Fletcher, Stanley M.; Revoredo-Giha, Cesar. |
| In the paper, alternative contractual arrangements between crop producers and processors are evaluated with a view of addressing the major issues present in peanut markets in the U.S., the major EU supplier of high quality peanuts. The issues are the thinness of the spot markets and the absence of quality premiums, both of which impair market efficiency. Results indicate that introducing contracts with a system of quality differentials creates incentives for producer self-selection to participate in the post harvest cash market. Moreover, in the presence of sufficiently high common production risk, tournament contracts are more efficient and preferred by the producers than the standard fixed premium schedules. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Contracts; Tournaments; Efficiency; Spot markets; Peanuts; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24703 |
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| Rahman, Shaikh Mahfuzur. |
| A unique approach using a biophysical growth model from the animal science literature is used to examine optimal contract cattle feeding behavior under alternative climatic conditions. The examination of incentives and outcomes in an unusually comprehensive contract parameter and behavioral space is made possible by combining simulated feedlot and carcass performance of a large set of cattle with public price and weather data. The model uniquely fits typical risk aversion levels and rationalizes existing contract types. The results show that optimal cattle feeding contract varies with climatic condition, but there is a tendency to replace cost-of-gain contracts with yardage-feed contracts as grid pricing has emerged. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cattle; Feeding; Contracts; Climate; Industrial Organization; D80. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61451 |
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| Mizumoto, Fabio Matuoka; Zylbersztajn, Decio. |
| This study investigates the reasons which lead the companies to keep simultaneous vertical integrated, third part and hybrid distribution channels. Companies establish different coordination structures, the organizational arrangements, which determine how the agents involved cooperate to the development of distribution activities, according to Transaction Cost Economics and Dynamic Competence. Even choosing different distribution channels, why the company does not establish one single organizational arrangement? What factors may justify the establishment of different arrangements? Possible explanations to those questions have been pointed out in multiple distribution channels. The empirical research indicates that firms establish multiple efficient... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Distribution channels; Poultry industry; Contracts; Organizational arrangements.. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43813 |
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| Olynk, Nicole J.; Wolf, Christopher A.. |
| Dairy managers today are faced with the decision to either raise their own replacements on the dairy farm or send heifers to a custom heifer grower. The largest potential challenge of contracting out the heifer raising enterprise revolves around the potential for a moral hazard problem because of hidden action on the part of the custom heifer grower. A principal-agent framework was used to elicit contract terms which provide incentives for the custom heifer grower to perform accelerated growth without heifers becoming over-conditioned. In order to provide incentives to custom growers, heifers returned to the dairy farm should be compared in performance to other heifers of similar age. We solve for the price paid per pound of gain, price paid for inch... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Farm management; Production economics; Contracts; Heifer growth; Moral hazard; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6077 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.; Boyd, James. |
| This paper explores ways in which economic analysis can help resolve the stranded cost controversy that has arisen in debates over electricity market deregulation. "Stranded costs" are costs electric utilities will not recover as power markets move from protected monopolies to an open, competitive environment. The paper begins with a description of the stranded cost problem, its magnitude, and the prominent arguments for and against recovery. We then turn to an analysis of contracts in order to understand whether there is, or should be, a legal duty to compensate utility shareholders for unrecovered costs. The paper also argues that efficient approaches to electricity deregulation will rely on more than an analysis of contracts. In particular, the politics... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Stranded costs; Deregulation; Takings; Electric utilities; Contracts; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; L43; L94; K12. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10688 |
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| Nadolnyak, Denis A.; Fletcher, Stanley M.. |
| In the paper, we analyze two issues that are important in the U.S. peanut markets: the absence of explicit quality premiums in the crop contracts, and the thinness of the postharvest cash/spot markets, which obstructs the operation of current production support policies. We argue that introduction of quality differentials in the form of either fixed premium or rank-order tournament contracts may kill two birds with one stone by increasing the spot market turnover and providing incentives for increasing crop quality. In addition, this arrangement is likely to reduce the costs of the federal support programs. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Contracts; Tournaments; Efficiency; Cash markets; Peanuts; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25274 |
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| Martinez, Stephen W.. |
| Recent changes in structure of the U.S. pork industry reflect, in many ways, past changes in the broiler industry. Production contracts and vertical integration in the broiler industry facilitated rapid adoption of new technology, improved quality control, assured market outlets for broilers, and provided a steady flow of broilers for processing. Affordable, high-quality chicken products have contributed to continual increases in U.S. chicken consumption, which has surpassed pork and beef on a per capita basis. Incentives for contracting and vertical integration in the pork industry may yield comparable results. If so, these arrangements might be expected to result in larger supplies of higher quality pork products at economical prices. |
| Tipo: Report |
Palavras-chave: Vertical coordination; Vertical integration; Contracts; Transaction costs; Technology; Chicken; Pork; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/34031 |
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| Lema, Daniel. |
| This paper presents an analysis of agricultural contracts using a transaction costs approach. We contend that in a context of modern agriculture, with well defined property rights, agricultural contracts must balance costs and benefits, aligning tenant and landlord incentives towards a similar objective. The study debates the potential effects of tenancy status and duration of contracts, over soil conservation and input use. We present empirical evidence about the effects over the soil and input use in tenant (fixed rent or sharecropping) and owner-operator farms using farm level data from the 2002 National Agricultural Census of Argentina. The empirical results show some differential effects but do not support a general and clear negative effect for... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Contracts; Agriculture; Transaction Costs; Sharecropping; Property Rights; Land Tenancy; Production Economics; D2; Q15. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25420 |
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| Ferreira, Gabriel Murad Velloso; Waquil, Paulo Dabdab; Goncalves, Wilson Magela. |
| The present research aimed to analyze the impact of opportunistic behavior and bounded rationality impacts in the forms of contract adopted by the Agricultural Consortium of Specialized Farms (C.A.F.E.). For that, a case study was accomplished with the objective to embrace the most important characteristics of the theme as well as its process of development. The theoretical reference that gave support to this study it was the Transaction Costs Economics (TCE). Through the analysis of the variables approached by TCE, more specifically the behavioral factors (bounded rationality, opportunism) and forms of contract, it was concluded that, in the case studied the existence of opportunism interferes in certain way in the trust increasing the transactional... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Contracts; Opportunism; Bounded rationality; Specialty coffees. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43810 |
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| Bontems, Philippe. |
| We explore in this paper the consequences of status seeking preferences among agents contracting with a private principal in the context of production. We examine in particular the case of envy and we show that in general envy entails augmented distortions due to asymmetric information in optimal contracts. Furthermore if the principal neglects the preferences of the agents with respect to status, then potentially there is under-participation to the contract. We also show that if the principal is free to choose who can participate to the contract, then under some conditions the principal may prefer to contract with only a subset of potentially "profitable" agents (that is where his utility is strictly positive). We then ask whether contracting with agents... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Status; Adverse selection; Contracts; Envy; Externalities; Production Economics; D6; H0; D86. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49507 |
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| Olynk, Nicole J.; Wolf, Christopher A.. |
| As dairy farms grow and specialize in milking cows, raising replacement heifers is increasingly outsourced. Perhaps the largest challenge of outsourcing the heifer enterprise involves quality, measured as milk production potential, and the possibility for moral hazard due to hidden action on the part of the custom heifer grower. A principal-agent framework was used to elicit contract terms to provide incentives for the heifer grower to achieve desired growth rates, and enable the return of the heifer to the dairy farm on an accelerated time frame, without sacrificing quality. To mitigate incentive asymmetries, bonuses and deductions are proposed. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Contracts; Heifer growth; Moral hazard; Principal agent; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99109 |
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| Registros recuperados: 47 | |
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