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| Registros recuperados: 12 | |
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| Petrick, Martin. |
| Welfare economics as the traditional, prescriptive theory framework used in agricultural economics has been criticised by institutional economists as being largely irrelevant to real-world policy issues. We therefore ask how normative statements are possible within an economic theory framework that does recognise the importance of institutional arrangements. Instead of applying established outcome-oriented criteria of social welfare, we examine whether the rules of economic interaction allow the acquisition of gains from cooperation. We suggest to reconstruct any interaction as an existing or repealed social dilemma. This approach helps to identify common rule interests which create room for improvement of all parties involved, and to suggest desirable... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural Finance; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; D02; D63; D74; Q14. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25702 |
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| Maldonado, Jorge Higinio; Moreno-Sanchez, Rocio del Pilar. |
| Economic Experimental Games (EEGs), focused to analyze dilemmas associated with the use of common pool resources, have shown that individuals make extraction decisions that deviate from the suboptimal Nash equilibrium. However, few studies have analyzed whether these deviations towards the social optimum are affected as the stock of resource changes. Performing EEG with local fishermen, we test the hypothesis that the behavior of participants differs under a situation of abundance versus one of scarcity. Our findings show that under a situation of scarcity, players over-extract a given resource, and thus make decisions above the Nash equilibrium; in doing so, they obtain less profit, mine the others-regarding interest, and exacerbate the tragedy of the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Tragedy of the commons intensified; Economic experimental games; Resource abundance; Resource scarcity; Dynamic effects; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Land Economics/Use; Public Economics; D01; D02; D03; O13; O54; Q01; Q22; C93; C72; C73; C23. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91170 |
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| Bierbrauer, Felix. |
| The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a profit-maximizing firm. This also makes participation constraints desirable. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Public goods; Mechanism Design; Incomplete Contracts; Regulation; Public Economics; D02; D82; H41; L51. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55325 |
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| Oddou, Remy. |
| This paper analyzes the effect of spillovers and congestion of local public goods on the segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdiction. Households living in the same place form a jurisdiction and produce a local public good, that creates positive spillovers in other jurisdictions and suffers from congestion. In every jurisdiction, the production of the local public good is financed through a local tax on household's wealth. Local wealth tax rates are democratically determined in all jurisdictions. Households also consume housing in their jurisdiction. Any household is free to leave its jurisdiction for another one that would increase its utility. A necessary and sufficient condition to have every stable jurisdiction structure segregated by... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Jurisdictions; Segregation; Spillovers; Congestion; Environmental Economics and Policy; C78; D02; H73; R13. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108259 |
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| Clark, Gordon L.; Monk, Ashby H.B.. |
| As representatives of nation-states in global financial markets, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) share a common form and many functions. Arguably their form and functions owe as much to a shared (global) moment of institutional formation as they owe their form and functions to the hegemony of Anglo-American finance over the late 20th and early 21st centuries. We distinguish between the immediate future for SWFs in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, and two possible long-term scenarios; one of which sees SWFs becoming financial goliaths dominating global markets, while the other sees SWFs morphing into nation-state development institutions that intermediate between financial markets and the long-term commitments of the nation-state sponsors. If... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Sovereign Wealth Funds; Crisis; Market Performance; Long-term Investment; Financial Economics; D02; F36; G15. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98098 |
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| Registros recuperados: 12 | |
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