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Registros recuperados: 29 | |
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Bastian, Christopher T.; Nagler, Amy M.; Menkhaus, Dale J.; Ehmke, Mariah D.; Whitaker, James B.; Young, C. Edwin. |
We use laboratory market experiments to assess the impact of asymmetric knowledge of a per-unit subsidy and the effect of a decoupled annual income subsidy on factor market outcomes. Results indicate that when the subsidy is tied to the factor as a per-unit subsidy, regardless of full or asymmetric knowledge for market participants, subsidized factor buyers distribute nearly 22 percent of the subsidy to factor sellers. When the subsidy is fully decoupled from the factor, as is the case with the annual payment, payment incidence is mitigated and prices are not statistically different from the no-policy treatment. |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Laboratory market experiments; Agricultural subsidies; Subsidy incidence; Land market; Ex ante policy analysis; Agricultural and Food Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Q18; D03; C92. |
Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/104108 |
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Pongiglione, Francesca. |
In this essay, three separate yet interconnected components of pro-environmental decision making are considered: (a) knowledge, in the form of basic scientific understanding and procedural knowledge, (b) risk perception, as it relates to an individual’s direct experience of climate change and (c) self-interest, either monetary or status-driven. Drawing on a variety of sources in public policy, psychology, and economics, I examine the role of these concepts in inducing or discouraging pro-environmental behavior. Past researches have often overemphasized the weight of just one of those variables in the decision making. I argue, instead, that none of them alone is capable of bringing about the behavioral change required by the environmental crisis. Evidence... |
Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Individual Behavior; Climate-Change; Psychology; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; D03; D80; Q00. |
Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/119094 |
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Erdem, Seda; Rigby, Dan; Wossink, Ada. |
We report results of an analysis of the attribution of relative responsibility across the stages of the food chain for ensuring food safety. Specifically, we identify perceptions of the share of the overall responsibility that each stage in the food chain has to ensure that the meat people cook and eat at home does not cause them to become ill. Results are reported for two groups of stakeholders: consumers and farmers, and for two types of meat: chicken and beef. The stakeholders’ opinions regarding the relative degrees of responsibility of the sequential food chain stages (feed supplier, farmer, livestock transportation, abattoir,… consumer) are elicited via surveys using the Maximum Difference technique (best-worst scaling). The data are analyzed using... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Q18; Q51; D03; D12. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91813 |
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Czap, Natalia V.; Czap, Hans J.; Khachaturyan, Marianna; Lynne, Gary D.; Burbach, Mark E.. |
This paper further tests dual interest theory and the metaeconomics approach to environmental choice, recognizing a possible role for empathy-sympathy (the basis for an internalized, shared other-interest) in tempering and conditioning the more fundamental tendency to pursue self-interest. To test, we focus on rivers flowing through agricultural areas carrying sediments, chemicals, and fertilizers which are making their way into downstream rivers and lakes. We use data from a framed experiment. Farmers decide on the usage of conservation technology to lessen impacts on the water quality in downstream areas, which is more costly. The results confirm our hypotheses, demonstrating that upstream farmers who practice conservation are tempering profit... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Dual-interest model; Metaeconomics; Empathy; Sympathy; Selfism; Environmental experiment; Behavioral economics; Water quality; Conservation tillage; Conservation policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C9; D03; Q25; Q53; Q57.. |
Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102866 |
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Maldonado, Jorge Higinio; Moreno-Sanchez, Rocio del Pilar. |
Economic Experimental Games (EEGs), focused to analyze dilemmas associated with the use of common pool resources, have shown that individuals make extraction decisions that deviate from the suboptimal Nash equilibrium. However, few studies have analyzed whether these deviations towards the social optimum are affected as the stock of resource changes. Performing EEG with local fishermen, we test the hypothesis that the behavior of participants differs under a situation of abundance versus one of scarcity. Our findings show that under a situation of scarcity, players over-extract a given resource, and thus make decisions above the Nash equilibrium; in doing so, they obtain less profit, mine the others-regarding interest, and exacerbate the tragedy of the... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Tragedy of the commons intensified; Economic experimental games; Resource abundance; Resource scarcity; Dynamic effects; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Land Economics/Use; Public Economics; D01; D02; D03; O13; O54; Q01; Q22; C93; C72; C73; C23. |
Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91170 |
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Cervellati, Matteo; Vanin, Paolo. |
We propose a theory studying temptation in presence of both externally and internally sanctioned prohibitions. Moral values that (internally) sanction prohibited actions and their desire may increase utility by reducing self-control costs, thereby serving as partial commitment devices. We apply the model to crime and study the conditions under which agents would optimally adhere to moral values of honesty. Incentives to be moral are non- monotonic in the crime premium. Larger external punishments increase temptation and demand for morality, so that external and internal sanctions are complements. The model helps rationalizing stylized facts that proved difficult to explain with available theories. |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Prohibitions; Temptation; Self-Control; Moral Values; Crime; Labor and Human Capital; D03; K42; Z13. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90905 |
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Almenberg, Johan; Dreber, Anna. |
We designed an experiment that examines how knowledge about the price of a good, and the time at which the information is received, affects how the good is experienced. The good in question was wine, and the price was either high or low. Our results suggest that hosts offering wine to guests can safely reveal the price: much is gained if the wine is expensive, and little is lost if it is cheap. Disclosing the high price before tasting the wine produces considerably higher ratings, although only from women. Disclosing the low price, by contrast, does not result in lower ratings. Our finding indicates that price not only serves to clear markets, it also serves as a marketing tool; it influences expectations that in turn shape a consumer’s experience. In... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Price-Quality Heuristic; Attribute Information; Role of Expectations; Marketing; Blind Tasting; Wine; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; C91; D03; D83; M31. |
Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51755 |
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Registros recuperados: 29 | |
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