SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele.

Exclusive rights granted by public authorities, like concessions to develop natural resources or electromagnetic spectrum licences, often have option-like features. However, to avoid licences being unused for lengthy periods, regulators sometimes set time limits, after which the exclusive right of exercise may be revoked. In this paper we analyse the impact of use or lose ("UOL") provisions upon the private time of investment. We find that the risk of losing the licence because of inaction generally increases the probability of early investment. However, when capital costs are expected to decline over time, UOL provisions may involve a "perverse effect", by increasing, rather than reducing, the expected time of investment, with respect to a situation where...

Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements

Palavras-chave: Licences; Real Options; Use or Lose Provisions; Time of Investment; Financial Economics; L51; D44; D92.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59756

Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele.

We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate...

Initial Endowment Effects in Multi-Unit Vickrey Auctions

Palavras-chave: Concessions; Auctions; Award criteria; Service Rollout Time limits; Public Economics; L51; D44; D92.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50409

Akaichi, Faiçal; Nayga, Rodolfo M., Jr.; Gil, Jose Maria.

We report the result of experiments designed to assess the effect of initial endowments on willingness to pay values elicited from multi-unit Vickrey auctions. Comparing bids from an “endow and upgrade” approach with the “full bidding” approach, we find that the direction of the endowment effect generally depends on the number of endowed units of the conventional product that subjects are willing to give up in exchange for units of the upgraded product. The endowment effect is “reverse” when the number of units that participants are willing to give up is lower or equal to the number of remaining endowed units. However, we generally find an endowment effect when the number of units a participant is willing to give up is higher than the number of remaining...

Using Experimental Auctions for Marketing Applications: A Discussion

Palavras-chave: Endowment effect; Number of units of the endowed product; Multi-unit Vickrey auctions.; Agribusiness; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; C91; D12; D44.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103041

Pigs in Cyberspace: A Natural Experiment Testing Differences between Online and Offline Club-Pig Auctions

Lusk, Jayson L..

The present article discusses general issues associated with experimental auctions and their relative advantages and disadvantages over other marketing research techniques. Experimental auctions create an active market environment with feedback where subjects exchange real goods and real money, which is not generally the case with other methods. The article also discusses four experimental design issues associated with experimental auctions: auction mechanism, market feedback and bidder affiliation, demand reduction and wealth effects, and multiple attribute valuation. Each of these experimental design issues, if not properly controlled, have the potential to create serious flaws in marketing recommendations.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Experimental economics; Marketing; Valuation; Willingness-to-pay; D44; C92; Q13; M31.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43210

Roe, Brian E.; Wyszynski, Timothy E..

We find sale prices and net revenues received by sellers in the Midwestern club pig market are higher at traditional face-to-face auctions than at comparable Internet auctions. The comparison overcomes adverse selection issues that commonly plague such analyses by using data from sellers that allocated pigs to both markets based solely on exogenous differences in dates between online and offline auctions. Furthermore, both auctions feature ascending price formats with ‘soft-endings’ and remaining quality variation is controlled by using detailed information on animal, seller and event characteristics. The results suggest that the higher prices and net revenues from traditional auctions are attributable to remaining differences in auction format and...

Buying Fields and Marrying Daughters: An Empirical Analysis of Rosca Auctions in a South Indian Village

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Electronic commerce; Two-sided markets; Livestock marketing; Hedonic models; Agribusiness; Industrial Organization; Livestock Production/Industries; Marketing; D44; Q13.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102940

Klonner, Stefan.

A bidding rotating savings and credit association (Rosca) is modeled as a sequence of symmetric-independent-private-value auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders. We estimate a structural econometric model which, by introducing an altruistic component into each bidder's utility function, allows for socially favorable deviations from the private information, non-altruistic bidding equilibrium. We find that bidding is more altruistic in groups managed by experienced organizers and in Roscas whose current members have already run through more than one Rosca cycle of the current group, implying that effective leadership and enduring relationships help mitigate the social cost of strategic behavior. When a bidder has to meet an unforeseen...

Unilateral and Exclusionary/Strategic Effects of Common Agency: Price Impacts in a Repeated Common Value English Auction

Palavras-chave: Roscas; Auctions; Consumer/Household Economics; D44; G20.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28449

Coatney, Kalyn T.; Shaffer, Sherrill L.; Menkhaus, Dale J.; Scheer, Jennifer L..

The business justification for multiple principals to hire a common agent is efficiency. Our empirical study demonstrates that the creation of the common agent unilaterally depresses winning bids. Additionally, the common agent was not only observed to be the dominant bidder but also paid significantly lower prices than fringe competitors (price/quantity differential). The observed price/quantity differential is consistent with the almost common value English auction theory developed by Rose and Kagel (2008) in which a cost advantaged bidder is able to reduce competition by credibly raising the costs of disadvantaged rivals associated with the winner’s curse.

Auction Markets for Specialty Food Products with Geographical Indications

Palavras-chave: Common Value Auctions; Common Agency; Antitrust; Industrial Organization; D44; K21; K23.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56529

Schamel, Guenter.

We present a first analysis of auction markets for specialty food products. We identify auction prices, trade volume and value for domestic and foreign origin specialty ham with geographical indications (GIs) which were actually sold in online auctions in Germany within a one-month period. Applying hedonic modeling, we examine potential factors that may influence online bidding behavior and final auction prices. We estimate positive auction price effects for weight, bidding activity, and auction length, that the domestic product is sold at a discount, that higher shipping cost have a negative impact on final prices, and that auctions ending on Fridays and Saturdays yield lower prices. The model may be used to estimate the value of GIs. In our example, we...

Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions

Palavras-chave: Consumer economics; Geographical indications; Auctions; Information; Marketing; D12; D44; D83.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25606

Understanding Factors That Influence Breeders to Sell Bulls at Performance Tests

Davis, David E..

State WIC agencies in infant-formula procurement auctions receive lower bids and final prices when they are in buyer’s alliances than when they are unallied. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) uses an auction to procure infant formula. Manufacturers bid on the right to be an agency’s sole supplier by offering a rebate on formula sold through WIC. A theoretical model of rebates shows that bidders may shade their bids and extract surplus from agencies. An empirical estimation shows that bids are lower to alliances suggesting that alliances countervail the power of bidders to extract surplus.

Tipo: Working Paper

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Food assistance; Countervailing power; Buyer concentration; Oligopoly; WIC.; Consumer/Household Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Industrial Organization; L13; D43; D44; Q18; I18.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123863

Lillywhite, Jay M.; Simonsen, J..

Breeders of purebred bulls have multiple avenues to market their bulls, including consignment at public auctions associated with performance tests. Purebred breeders often have the opportunity to withdraw bulls that are eligible to sell in these auctions. We examine sales data from a public auction held in conjunction with a performance bull test in Tucumcari, NM, to gain insights on breeder decisions to withdraw bulls prior to entering the sales ring. Specifically, we use a binary logit model to identify relevant characteristics that affect a breeder’s decision to withdraw a sale eligible bull from the auction.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Breeder decisions; Livestock; Performance bull test; Agribusiness; Demand and Price Analysis; Livestock Production/Industries; Productivity Analysis; C31; D23; D44; D83; M31; Q13.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/47264

Variabilidad de corto plazo en la formación de precios en mercados de haciendas en el Uruguay.

Lanfranco, Bruno A.; Ois, Cecilia; Bedat, Alina.

El mercado de haciendas es un mercado diferenciado, donde la calidad del producto está determinada por un conjunto de atributos que lo define completamente. Existe un diferencial de precios (premios y descuentos) que depende de las características del ganado. A través de un modelo de precios hedónicos se estimó el valor monetario que el mercado otorga a dichas características, medidas sobre más de 8.000 lotes (454 mil vacunos) comercializados por pantalla. La mayoría de las variables incluidas en los catálogos incidieron en la formación de los precios. Peso, sexo, raza, clase, estado, procedencia, uniformidad, tratamiento nutricional y conocimiento del mío-mío, son características que afectaron significativamente el precio. Varias de estas variables...

Tipo: Book

Palavras-chave: Hedonic prices; Product differentiation; Demand for characteristics; Agribusiness; Demand and Price Analysis; Livestock Production/Industries; Marketing; D44; L15; Q13.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121686

Evaluating conservation auctions with limited information: the policy maker’s predicament

Schilizzi, Steven; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe.

Buying environmental services from private landholders using tendering mechanisms are usually subject to a budget constraint. Auction theory has mostly focused on target-constrained auctions and is less well developed for this type of auction. This paper examines a theoretical model specifically developed for budget-constrained tenders and assesses its capacity to predict tendering performance under information limitations typical of those found in field applications. But this assessment cannot be done without complementing the model with controlled laboratory experiments. Subject to their external validity, we find that the model is able to make the correct policy recommendation when comparing the tender to an equivalent fixed price scheme, even when the...

Does tendering conservation contracts with performance payments generate additional benefits?

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Economic experiments; Model validation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; C91; C92; D44; Q24; Q28.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100884

Schilizzi, Steven; Breustedt, Gunnar; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe.

Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to supply non-marketed environmental services may need to provide efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored to achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and submitting the contracts to competitive tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the potential benefits of both approaches. Landholders’ risk aversion to only partially controlled outcomes may offset incentive effects if the fall in participation outweighs any increases in individual effort. Controlled lab experiments were designed on the basis of a theoretical model and were run in two countries, with varying rates of payments linked to environmental outcomes. Results...

An Experimental Examination of Target Based Conservation Auctions

Palavras-chave: Conservation tenders; Auctions; Incentive contracts; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Experimental economics; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; C92; D44; D82; D86; H57; Q24; Q28.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100883

Boxall, Peter C.; Perger, Orsolya; Packman, Katherine.

Conservation auctions (CA) are typically employed to increase the provision of Ecological Goods and Services (EG&S) for achieving environmental goals. This paper exmaines the ability of a CA to meet an environmental target. Previous research on this topic used the number of contracts as a target rather than some specified environmental goal. We used experimental economic methods benchmarked to a wetlands restoration case study to examine a target constraint that must be met by bidders rather than a budget constraint. However, since no budget constraint is employed, agencies with limited resources might have to use other auction design procedures to ensure that financial outlays to pay winning bidders are not too high while meeting the target....

Tipo: Working Paper

Palavras-chave: Conservation auctions; Environmental target; Experimental economics; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q52; Q58; D44.

Ano: 2012

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121624

Competition In or For the Field: Which Is Better?

Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander.

In many circumstances, a principal, who wants prices to be as low as possible, must contract with agents who would like to charge the monopoly price. This paper compares a Demsetz auction, which awards an exclusive contract to the agent bidding the lowest price (competition for the field) with having two agents provide the good under (imperfectly) competitive conditions (competition in the field). We obtain a simple sufficient condition showing unambiguously which option is best. The condition depends only on the shapes of the surplus function of the principal and the profit function of agents, and is independent of the particular duopoly game played ex post. We apply this condition to three canonical examples-procurement, royalty contracts and...

Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement: A Simple Model of Handicapping

Palavras-chave: Demsetz auction; Double marginalization; Franchising; Joint vs. separate auctions; Monopoly; Procurement; Dealerships; Royalty contracts; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D44; L12; L92.

Ano: 2002

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28406

Albano, Gian Luigi; Cesi, Berardino.

When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, buyers may use different strategies depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, verifiable by contracting parties and by courts. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with different efficiency levels. If the contractor does not deliver the agreed level of performance the buyer may handicap the same firm in future competitive...

Results from the Farm Behaviour Component of the Integrated Economic-Hydrologic Model for the Watershed Evaluation of Beneficial Management Practices Program

Palavras-chave: Repeated Procurement; Handicapping; Relational Contracts; Stick and Carrot Strategy; Political Economy; C73; D82; D44; H57; K12; L14.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6370

Boxall, Peter C.; Weber, Marian; Perger, Orsolya; Cutlac, Marius; Samarawickrema, Antony.

This report summarizes preliminary results from the Farm Behavior component of the South Tobacco Creek Integrated Modeling Project (STC Project) which is being undertaken as part of the Watershed Evaluation of BMPs (WEBs) Program. WEBS is a partnership between Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) and Ducks Unlimited Canada (DUC) established to evaluate the economic and environmental performance of BMPs for water quality at the watershed scale. Water draining from South Tobacco Creek eventually enters to Lake Winnipeg which is degraded from the cumulative effects of nutrient loading, particularly phosphorous. Many jurisdictions across the world, including Canada, use payments programs to encourage land owners to change land management practices in order...

Tipo: Report

Palavras-chave: Watersheds South Tobacco Creek water quality Environmental Economics and Policy Land Economics/Use Resource /Energy Economics and Policy Q12; Q52; D44.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116268

Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values

Forges, Francoise; Orzach, Ram.

In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism.

Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Bayesian Game; Collusion; Core; Partition Form Game; Characteristic Function; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D44.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96668

Albano, Gian Luigi; Dini, Federico; Zampino, Roberto.

Competitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that open competition can perform poorly in allocating complex projects. In exploring the determinants of suppliers’ bidding behavior in procurement auctions for complex IT services, we find results that are consistent with theory. We find that price and quality do not exhibit the classical tradeoff one would expect: quite surprisingly, high quality is associated to low prices. Furthermore, while quality is mainly driven by suppliers’ experience, price is affected more by the scoring rule and by the level...

Tractors on eBay: Differences between Internet and In-Person Auctions

Palavras-chave: Procurement Auctions; Scoring Rules; IT Contracts; Price/Quality Ratio; Demand and Price Analysis; D44; D86; H51; H57.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46547

Diekmann, Florian; Roe, Brian E.; Batte, Marvin T..

Internet auction platforms are changing the face of transactions in many business sectors, including agriculture. We provide one of the first systematic examinations of the differences between internet and in-person auctions in agricultural input markets. A hedonic model estimated with used tractor transactions from Midwestern sellers pooled between eBay and in-person auctions reveals statistically distinct price surfaces for the two auction venues and predicts significantly lower prices for comparable equipment sold on eBay, though this difference is attenuated for tractors fully covered by eBay's buyer protection program and is fully absent for the most frequently traded tractor. An endogenous venue-selection model reveals that larger, more-valuable...