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| Registros recuperados: 45 | |
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| Gaigne, Carl; Riou, Stephane; Thisse, Jacques-Francois. |
| There is a wide consensus among international institutions and national governments in favor of compact (i.e. densely populated) cities as a way to improve the ecological performance of the transport system. Indeed, when both the intercity and intra-urban distributions of activities are given, a higher population density makes cities more environmentally friendly as the average commuting length is reduced. However, when we account for the possible relocation of activities within and between cities in response to a higher population density, the latter may cease to hold. Because changes in population density affect land rents and wages, firms and workers re-optimize and choose new locations. We show that this may reshape the urban system in a way that... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Greenhouse gas; Commuting costs; Transport costs; Cities; Environmental Economics and Policy; D61; F12; Q54; Q58; R12. |
| Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121692 |
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| Farrow, Scott; Toman, Michael. |
| In this paper we first describe the legal and administrative basis of mandates that variously require and eschew economic measures for environmental management. We then summarize the steps involved in benefit-cost analysis and what can and cannot be accomplished with such information. Our basic conclusion is that while the approach is not perfect, benefit-cost analysis has a solid methodological footing and provides a valuable performance measure for an important governmental function, improving the well-being of society. However, benefit-cost analysis requires analytical judgements which, if done poorly, can obfuscate an issue or worse, provide a refuge for scoundrels in the policy debate. We conclude the article with specific suggestions for both the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Benefit-cost analysis; Environmental regulation; Regulatory reform; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; D61; H43. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10598 |
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| Vetter, Henrik. |
| In perfectly competitive markets taxes and quotas are fully equivalent measures for environmental protection. Based on this regulators' revealed preferences for quotas over that of fees finds its explanation in the procedures and spirits of political decision making. This paper offers another explanation: Ordinary welfare economic considerations make a quota preferable to a tax when regulating polluting firms in monopolistically competitive markets. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Demand and Price Analysis; D61; D62; D43. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24203 |
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| Smith, V. Kerry; van Houtven, George; Pattanayak, Subhrendu K.. |
| This paper proposes and illustrates the use of a new approach to benefit transfer for the non-market valuation of environmental resources. It treats transfer as an identification problem that requires assessing whether available benefit estimates permit the parameters of a preference function to be identified. The transfer method proposed uses these identifying restrictions to calibrate preference parameters and bases the benefit estimates on that preference function. The approach is illustrated using travel cost, hedonic and contingent valuation estimates, as well as combinations of estimates. It has three potential advantages over conventional practice: (1) it allows multiple, potentially overlapping estimates of the benefits of an improvement in... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Benefit transfer; Calibration; Non-market valuation; Environmental Economics and Policy; D61; Q20; H40. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10607 |
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| Zhang, Xiaobo; Tan, Kong-Yam. |
| A key objective of China's reform program was to reduce distortions in the economic system and enhance growth. However, when implemented in incremental and partial ways, local governments or individuals have chance to capture rents inherent in the reform process. Young (2000) warned that the rent-seeking behavior might lead to increasing market fragmentation. Empirical studies have since shown that this did not happen in the product markets. In this paper we argue that as rents from the product markets were squeezed out during the reform process, rent-seeking behavior shifted to the factor markets, especially the capital and land markets. The reform process now needs to be deepened to ensure that the factor markets also become more integrated and efficient. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Reform; China; Rent Seeking; Factor and Product Market; Transition; International Development; D33; D61; D63; O11; O53; P23. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60183 |
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| Fischer, Carolyn; Fox, Alan K.. |
| The choice of mechanism for allocating tradable emissions permits has important efficiency and distributional effects when tax and trade distortions are considered. We present different rules for allocating carbon allowances within sectors (lump-sum grandfathering, output-based allocation [OBA], and auctioning) and among sectors (historical emissions and value-added shares). Using a partial equilibrium model, we explore how OBA mitigates price increases, limits incentives for conservation in favor of lowering energy intensity, and changes relative output prices among sectors. We then use a computable general equilibrium model from the Global Trade Analysis Project, modified to incorporate a labor/leisure choice, to compare overall mechanism performance.... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Emissions trading; Output-based allocation; Tax interaction; Carbon leakage; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q2; Q43; H2; D61. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10654 |
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| Bernard, Alain; Fischer, Carolyn; Vielle, Marc. |
| Political pressure often exists for rebating environmental levies, particularly when incomplete regulatory coverage allegedly creates an"unlevel playing field" with other, unregulated firms or industries. This paper assesses the conditions under which rebating environmental levies is justified for the regulated sector. It combines a theoretical approach based on second-best modeling with numerical simulations aimed at determining the most sensitive parameters. We find that if an adequate tax on production can be levied in the unregulated sector, no rebate is justified for the regulated sector. Moreover, even in the case of constrained taxation in the unregulated sector, a tax rebate or a subsidy in the regulated sector is not necessarily a... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental levy; Tax rebate; Fiscal distortions; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q2; Q43; H2; D61. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10512 |
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| Registros recuperados: 45 | |
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